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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, several novel cyber fault diagnosis and prognosis and defense
methodologies for cyber-physical systems have been proposed. First, a novel routing scheme
for wireless mesh network is proposed. An effective capacity estimation for P2P and E2E
path is designed to guarantee the vital transmission safety. This scheme can ensure a high
quality of service (QoS) under imperfect network condition, even cyber attacks. Then, the
imperfection, uncertainties, and dynamics in the cyberspace are considered both in system
model and controller design. A PDF identifier is proposed to capture the time-varying
delays and its distribution. With the modification of traditional stochastic optimal control
using PDF of delays, the assumption of full knowledge of network imperfection in priori
is relaxed. This proposed controller is considered a novel resilience control strategy for
cyber fault diagnosis and prognosis. After that, we turn to the development of a general
framework for cyber fault diagnosis and prognosis schemes for CPSswherein the cyberspace
performance affect the physical system and vice versa. A novel cyber fault diagnosis scheme
is proposed. It is capable of detecting cyber fault by monitoring the probability of delays.
Also, the isolation of cyber and physical system fault is achieved with cooperating with
the traditional observer based physical system fault detection. Next, a novel cyber fault
prognosis scheme, which can detect and estimate cyber fault and its negative effects on
system performance ahead of time, is proposed. Moreover, soft and hard cyber faults are
isolated depending on whether potential threats on system stability is predicted. Finally,
one-class SVM is employed to classify healthy and erroneous delays. Then, another cyber
fault prognosis based on OCSVM is proposed.
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In the past a few decades, the term cyber-physical systems (CPSs) refers to a new
generation of systems with integrated computational and physical capabilities that can in-
teract with humans through many new modalities (Fig.1.1). Successful applications of
CPSs are found in areas as diverse as vehicle industry (CAN-based data communication
Johansson et al. (2005)), teleoperation Arcara and Melchiorri (2002), power system Wang
et al. (2012) Sridhar et al. (2012), transportation systems Liu et al. (2011), manufacturing
Lee et al. (2015) and high-confidence health-care system Haque et al. (2014). Smart indus-
try, smart city, even smart world are made possible by the broad dissemination of mobile
devices with substantial computation resources(e.g., processing and storage capacity), a
variety of sensors (e.g., cameras, GPS, speakers, microphone and light and proximity sen-
sors), and multiple communication mechanisms (e.g. cellular, Wi-Fi Bluetooth) allowing
interconnection to the Internet as well as to other devices Rawat et al. (2015).
Embedded computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes,
usually with feedback loops where physical processes affect computations and vice versa.
Such a complex interconnection of a physical system, communication network, and com-
putational component brings challenges on modeling, control, computation and security.
Especially, the embedded cyberspace imposes restrictions on the exchange of information,
such a limited channel capacity, traffic congestions, and malicious cyber attacks. Such
network imperfections can degrade not only the communication performance, but also the




















Figure 1.1. Cyber-physical system structure
self-driving cars have a large number of radars, cameras, and other various electrical com-
ponents (known as electronic control units, or ECUs) connected via an internal network. If
hackers manage to gain access to a vulnerable, peripheral ECU (the Bluetooth or infotain-
ment system) from there they may be able to take control of safety critical ECUs like its
brakes or engine and wreak havoc. Therefore, reliability of CPSs -particularly resilience,
safety, and security - is a more complex issue than ever before.
Over the years, computer science researches have pioneered the development of new
real-time computing techniques, visualization methods, embedded systems architectures,
and innovative approaches to ensure computer system reliability, cyber security and fault
tolerance. At the same time, systems and control researchers havemademajor breakthroughs
in powerful engineering methods and tools to improve the resilience and reliability for
industrial processes, such as system identification, filtering, prediction, optimization, robust
control, stochastic control, and fault diagnosis and prognosis schemes. With respect to the
3above works, cyber-physical systems research should integrate knowledge and engineering
principles across the computational and engineering disciplines (network, control, software,
human interaction, learning theory) to develop new CPS science and supporting technology.
A high resilience CPS requires the following capabilities:
a) Detection abnormalities in the cyberspace and protection of information and
network performance.
b) Detection of physical system abnormalities and protection of CPS stability.
c) Protection of system performance under cyber abnormalities.
The overall goals of the first capability (a)) include integrity (the trustworthiness of
data or resources), availability (accessibility upon demand), and confidentiality (keeping
information secret from unauthorized users). Many researchers addressed these issues
with different technologies, such as authentication schemes, access control, and other
defense scheme Pasqualetti et al. (2013)-Cardenas et al. (2008). An assumption that the
adversary/attack model is fully known is often required; however, it is challenging to get.
Gamage et al. (2010) proposed a general theory of event compensation as an information
flow security enforcement mechanism for CPSs. Message scheduling methods were given
to improve the security quality of wireless networks for mission-critical CPSs in Jiang et al.
(2010). In Amin et al. (2009), deception and denial of service attacks had been addressed
by a countermeasure based on semi-definite programming. False data injection attacks
against static state estimator are studied in Liu et al. (2011). In a similar fashion, stealthy
deception attacks against the Supervisory Control (SC) and Data Acquisition system (DAS),
replay attacks, and covert attacks against control systems were investigated in Teixeira et al.
(2010), Mo and Sinopoli (2009), and Smith (2011) respectively. With respect to the above
works, Pasqualetti et al. (2013) proposed a mathematical framework for CPSs, attacks,
and monitors, and given the fundamental limitations of monitors from system-theoretic
and graph-theoretic perspectives. Finally, centralized and distributed attack detection and
identification monitors were designed. Overall, the cyber attacks can be addressed on the
4cyber side. However, the defense of cyber attack is still open for the further research, such
as optimizing the limited channel resource for transmissions, maximizing path capacity
to improve the quality of service (QoS), and so on. In addition, the effects of cyber
attacks/faults on the physical system behavior are oversimplified in above existing works.
Moreover, the injection time and model of the attacks/faults are difficult to learn ahead of
time in practical CPSs.
Then, the second requirement (b)) has been studied by many control researchers.
They focused on the conventional fault detection techniques that have successfully applied
to industrial networked control systems (NCSs). They indeed took the network delay and
packet loss into consideration in various ways. In Liu and Yao (2005), network delays were
modeled as a constant delay (time buffer), an independent random delay, and a delay with
known probability distribution governed by the Markov chain model. In Liu et al. (2007a),
a networked predictive controller in the presence of random delay in both forward and
feedback channels was proposed to minimized the effects of network failures. A robust H∞
control for a nonlinear T-S fuzzy model system was proposed to address the network delays
and packet drop in Zhang et al. (2007). Wang et al. (2008) and Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong
(2007) employed a state observer-based fault detection method on the uncertain long time
delay. Although, the network delays and packet drop caused by network faults/failures
were considered in above works, the assumptions, such as known bounds and time invariant
distribution of delays and packet loss, are always made. In addition, most of the above
works aimed to detect the faults of physical components (sensors, actuators, and system
plant), not the faults in the cyberspace.
However, how to meet the third requirement (c)) is still open for the further research.
First of all, a full knowledge of the relation between cyber condition and system performance
is crucial. That need a general model which fully present both physical system dynamics and
cyberspace uncertainties. Then, the fault detection should be redesigned both on cyber and
physical system side. Moreover, the isolation of cyber and physical system abnormalities is
5essential. Therefore, only one observer for monitoring system states is not sufficient. Other
observers for monitoring cyber condition should be proposed. At last, resilience control
design should fully consider the cyber dynamics to tolerant both cyber and physical system
faults/attacks.
To conclude, CPSs with an interaction of various subsystems and networks do
not allow decoupling design either for system control strategy or for network security
protection. Fault diagnosis and tolerant control for CPSs should be also redesigned with
fully considering both cyber and physical system faults. Such a comprehensive fault
detection and defense framework, which is lacking in the existing literature to the best of
our knowledge, is the main objective of this dissertation.
1.2. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
In this dissertation, several cyber fault diagnosis and prognosis schemes and the
corresponding defense schemes have been proposed. This dissertation is presented in five
papers, and their relationship to the one another is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. The schemes in
these five papers can be widely used to detect and defense cyber faults/attacks in CPSs.
In the first paper, the objective is to transmit packages using the path with the
highest capacity. A capacity estimation based routing scheme is proposed for wireless
mesh network. When a cyber attack/fault occurs, the proposed scheme can re-route the
transmission based on the effective capacity estimation for each path to avoid packet losses
and QoS degradation. The model of entire network is derived with considering interactions
among links and paths, stochastic channel fading and noise. This scheme can be also applied
in mobile network since the effective capacity is estimated in an online manner.
Next, the uncertainties in cyberspace are addressed in the second paper. We proposed
a novel controller, named PDF-based tuning of stochastic optimal controller, which can
manage the unknown dynamics in the embedded cyberspace, such as long time delays and
packet losses. When cyber attacks occur, the proposed can be used as a resilience controller.
6Figure 1.2. Dissertation outline
In the third paper, we proposed a novel cyber fault diagnosis scheme. Cyber
fault/attack can be captured by monitoring PDF profile of network delays. Combining with
the physical states observer proposed in existing works, cyber and physical system faults can
be isolated. Such that the appropriate resilience control for cyber or physical fault mitigation
can be accurately triggered. The controller proposed in the second paper is consider the
resilience controller for cyber fault tolerance.
Subsequently, in the fourth paper, the proposed cyber diagnosis scheme in the
third paper is improved to optimizing the computational cost and cyber detection accuracy.
We proposed a novel cyber fault prognosis scheme to predict potential threats on CPS
performance and stability. A cyber fault isolation scheme is designed to classify soft and
hard cyber faults using system state prediction. For hard faults which potentially degrade
CPS performance, the proposed prognosis scheme can predict them and take appropriate
control action ahead of time before the system failure happening. Such that the resilience
control can be effectively triggered when necessary. Moreover, the computational cost is
significantly reduced.
7Finally, in the last paper, we proposed another cyber fault prognosis scheme
which applied one class kernel based support vector machine (OCSVM) to detect cyber
faults/attacks. OCSVM can accurately separate healthy and erroneous delays. The classi-
fication results can be used to isolate soft and hard cyber faults. Moreover, the proposed
scheme significantly reduce the unnecessary resilience control triggering.
1.3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation provides contributions to the area of cyber fault detection and
defense methodologies for CPSs. As a consequence, proposed designs can not only render
reliable cyber abnormalities detection in terms of isolation but also maintain the CPS
stability in the mean in the presence of unknown cyber dynamics, imperfections, and
attacks. Traditionally, the fault diagnosis and prognosis in the existing works oversimplify
network dynamics and its effects on system behavior. The proposed schemes, on the other
hand, fully consider above dynamics and modify the defense techniques to adapt to above
uncertainties. Overall, the proposed effort overcomes the mentioned deficiencies.
Themain contributions of Paper I include: a) thematrixmodelwith fully considering
stochastic channel fading, interaction among links or paths are derived; b) an effective
capacity estimation based on RBF neural network is proposed; c) routing schemes for
peer-to-peer and end-to-end communication are proposed respectively. Overall, with full
knowledge of achievable capacity for each path, the vital messages can be forwarded safely
and effectively.
The main contribution of the second paper is a novel stochastic optimal controller
is designed with fully considering uncertainties and dynamics. The PDF of delays is used
to tune controller parameters. Such that the controller can adapt to the delays and its
distribution variation. For the case of linear CPS, uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB)
stability is demonstrated by using Lyapunov analysis. In addition, the proposed controller
can be used as the resilience control in the reset papers.
8The contributions of Paper III include the cyber fault diagnosis using PDF moni-
toring of delays and cyber and physical system fault isolation. Kernel density estimation is
used in an online manner to update the probability of delays.
The contributions of the fourth paper include: a) a novel cyber prognosis scheme
is proposed; b) a time series analysis based distribution estimation is derived to predict
the future delay distribution; c) system state prediction is proposed based on the above
distribution estimation. Such that soft and hard cyber fault can be accurately separated.
Moreover, the convergence of this prediction is presented.
Finally, for the last paper, the main contribution is that OCSVM is designed and
applied to detect cyber faults/attacks. Then a multi-class classification machine is proposed
based on OCSVM. Such delay classification finally provide the health, soft fault, and hard
fault range for future cyber fault isolation. The computational cost for fault prognosis is
significantly reduced.
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ABSTRACT
Cyber physical system (CPS) is playing an important role in the smart industry,
which connects diverse systems leading to an inter-networked system of systems spanning
wide geographic areas. Wireless ad-hoc network (WANET) and mobile ad-hoc network
(MANET) are reliable and suitable candidates which can take an enormous amount of com-
munications in CPSs without requiring extra infrastructures. Moreover, each node/device
such as cellphone, and laptop, inWANET/MANET can participate in routing by forwarding
data for other nodes/device. The existing communication routing schemes are designed to
improve the performance of network without considering the interference, data collision and
cyber attacks issues. This negligence likely leads to the unexpected degradation of network
performance and more power consumption. Therefore, a full knowledge on interaction
among communicating links is necessary for improving the quality of communications
in CPSs. In this paper, a novel signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) model is
10
proposed, which includes explicit interaction among adjacent links within the entire net-
work. A novel RBF neural network prediction based capacity estimator is proposed to do
routing selection. The simulation results show that the path with the maximum available
capacity/SINR is selected accurately and the reliability of transmission is improved.
Keywords: cyber physical system, capacity estimation, routing scheme, RBF neural net-
work
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past several decades, cyber physical systems (CPSs) has attracted a great
deal of attention because they are likely to emerge through such network environments to
connect both humans and machines Lien et al. (2012)-Qu et al. (2010). However, it is
difficult to establish adequate network infrastructures anywhere and anytime Kawamoto
et al. (2013). Therefore, how to select an effective network to take an enormous amount
of communications with a high quality is a big challenge for composing CPSs. Wireless
ad-hoc network (WANET) and mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) based CPSs are flexible
and reliable because all nodes in CPS participate in routing by forwarding data for other
nodes. Such a WANET/MANET based CPS utilizes existing infrastructures and mobile
devices to do transmissions, such as laptops, cellphones, vehicles, and other networked
devices, instead of requiring extra infrastructures.
A challenge of WANET/MANET based CPSs is how to defense the interference and
channel fading induced by a large number of communications so that the critical messages
can be delivered with a high quality. This issue can be addressed by applying an optimized
transmission routing scheme. Typical routing schemes inWANET/MANETs, e.g. gradient-
based routing (GBR), and energy-aware routing (EAR) Al-Karaki and Kamal (2004), select
paths for an ideal case without any uncertainties. However, once a new routing path carries
traffic, it interacts and interferes with links in the entire network. This often results in
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a degraded performance during the routing path setup. Therefore, it is crucial that both
individual the link’s and the entire path’s performance must be determined and estimated
before selecting the path.
A transmission between the source and destination nodes has several alternative
paths. Each path consists of multiple links. Before transmitting the message, the source
node broadcasts a "Hello" message to find who can be the next relay of it so that the message
can be delivered safely and efficiently. Therefore, the performance of each possible path or
link should be evaluated accurately before the principal message sending out. Capacity is a
principal metrics for evaluating the performance of path or link. Therefore, the achievable
capacities of each alternative path or link should be known for the most optimal route
searching. The existing approaches Chen and Gerla (1998), Royer and Toh (1999), Shah
and Rabaey (2002) dealt with this challenge by posing assumptions: (a) knowing the
information (e.g., the achievable channel capacity and fading model parameter a priori),
(b) knowing the static (non-dynamic) network features, or (c) ignoring certain interactions,
including the explicit interlink interference in the routing schemes. However, in practical
network, the channel fading is stochastic and time-varying as well as the locations of
nodes or relays. The effectively achievable capacity is unknown, and it varies over time.
Consequently, the selected route is suboptimal due to these uncertainties. The primary
challenge in estimating the effective capacity is that the interactions among adjacent links
are complex and nonlinear. In addition, a full channel state between each pair of transmitter
and receiver is unknown and challenging to measure. Therefore, the capacity estimation is
not trivial for even a single link. The complexity of the estimation increases further when
we consider the establishment of a new, multi-hop path.
In this paper, a novel routing scheme is proposed for WANET/MANET based
CPSs, which guarantees the highest quality of communications with the lowest power
consumption. With considering interactions and interference among different path or link,
we also consider a stochastic channel fading. Meanwhile, the real time estimates of capacity
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and power are updated as the dynamic changes of topology /node location. For the prediction
of capacity and power, a RBF neural network predictor is designed, which is trained by a
few training data taken from "Hello" message. The training data is provided by the signal-
to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) model, which includes explicit interaction among
adjacent links within the entire network, so that the training process takes uncertainties
of channel into account. With a full knowledge of available maximum capacity, the vital
message can be forwarded safely and effectively.
The following part is organized into five sections. Section 2 summarized the related
works on capacity estimation. An example is presented to indicate our motivation in
Section 3. The proposed routing scheme is illustrated in Section 4. The evaluation of
the proposed scheme by simulations is presented in Section 5. Section 6 gives some
conclusions.
2. RELATEDWORKS ON CAPACITY ESTIMATION
Many researchers have studied both the network capacity and the techniques used to
maximize the capacity of path Asgeirsson and Mitra (2011); Chen et al. (2009); Gao et al.
(2006); Gastpar and Vetterli (2002); Gupta and Kumar (2000); Li et al. (2011); Li (2009);
Liang and Guo (2006); Wang and Wu (2009); Xue et al. (2005). Most of these works
on capacity analysis were focused on average performance in single-hop (P2P) networks.
Multi-hop routing (end-to-end) cases however, were not completely understood. Gupta
and Kumar (2000) collected landmark results for a P2P case that revealed the throughput
attainable by each of the n randomly located nodes is under a noninterference protocol. This
protocol is capable of transmittingW bits per second to a randomly chosen destination. This
destination is of the order of (W/√nlogn) bits per second. Gao et al. (2006) discussed the
channel capacity of networks with different sizes. Few studies, however, have been focused
on end-to-end capacity throughput.
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A number of studies have comprehensively addressed how to maximize capacity.
Gupta and Kumar (2000) discussed the interaction of 802.11 MAC with ad-hoc forward-
ing and its affects on the network’s channel capacity. They concluded that the average
distance between the source and the destination nodes must remain small as the network
grows to ensure an adequate and available total capacity in a larger network. Xue et al.
(2005) studied the effects of different types of fading on capacity throughput. They made
several assumptions. For example, the assumed that the channel fading type is known.
They also assumed that the fading is time invariant. Measuring such information in real
communication networks, however, is challenging. Other researchers Gastpar and Vetterli
(2002); Li et al. (2011); Li (2009) examined the throughput capacity in random networks,
the transport capacity in arbitrary networks. They sought to scale the network with antennas
under the known boundary conditions of capacity. They did not, however, predict the actual,
achievable capacity once the new traffic was introduced.
Several researchers have attempted to use either optimization techniques Liang and
Guo (2006), power allocation schemes Wang and Wu (2009), or game theory Asgeirsson
andMitra (2011) to maximize link and network capacities. Liang and Guo (2006) proposed
an energy-efficient online algorithm to maximize the network capacity for online disjoint
path connections and online multi-casting. They indicated that the network’s capacity is
proportional to its lifetime. Therefore, the proposed algorithm seeks to prolong the lifetime
and reduce the transmission energy consumption, so that the network’s capacity can be
maximized. Asgeirsson and Mitra (2011) applied a low-regret algorithm to reformulate the
capacity maximization problem into a power assignment domain. Overall, these schemes
maximizes capacity without understanding either the maximum achievable capacity or the
corresponding power requirements.
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In general, most of the work previously conducted was completed in an attempt
to maximize performance and capacity without understanding what the maximum is for
the particular network topology and traffic patterns. The routing decisions will often be
suboptimal when the maximum capacity along the route is unknown. Hence, the goal is to
predict capacity before the routing decision is made.
Jagannathan et al. (2006) based the power controls on a known, desired signal to
interference ratio (SIR). Determining such desired desired and achievable SIR values in an
ad-hocwireless networkwithout information on the network’s non-preexisting infrastructure
and dynamic topology, however, is difficult. The capacity-based performance cannot be
evaluated either without an optimal SIR. Hence, either the desired SIR or the capacity
should be reevaluated based on the existing information and data for the power control
issue.
3. MOTIVATION
The traditional routing schemes focus on optimizing the networks performance for
its current known state. This state includes channel capacities, topology, available energy,
service demand, and performance metrics. However, these schemes often ignore both the
interference and the interactions among the adjacent links. Interference is particularly
important for multi-path routing because it aggravates the issue of a bottleneck link, which
determines the entire path’s performance, illustrated in Fig. 1. Interference among the links
may also cause increased interference from strong links to the bottlenecks, thus further
weakening each link’s performance. Therefore, the maximum capacity of the entire path
should be obtained when all the links maintain the same capacity. No single bottleneck link
exists in such an ideal situation. The mutual interference is also reduced, thereby improving
both the average signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR) and the overall throughput.
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Figure 1. Bottleneck link with interfered by other links
This example illustrates how the interference affect the maximum capacity of path.
Nash equilibrium control designed by Gastpar and Vetterli (2002) is applied to guarantee
consistency of each link’s capacity.
The simulated network topology is shown in Fig. 2. Four nodes establish six links.
These links opportunistically set their target performance in terms of SINR. In the first
scenario, we studied the maximum capacity achievable on link 1 while the remaining links
maintained their desired performance. In second scenario, we studied the performance of
an entire routing path, from the source node 1 to the destination node 3. The results included
a comparison between the maximum path capacities.
The topology with four nodes and six links was considered the distance relation. It
was satisfied as d12 = d23 = d34 = d43 = d32 = d21 = d
We examined the relationship between the power and the capacity for the single link
case first. The knowledge of this relationship could make one link achieve the capacity as
high as possible. The maximum capacity of link 1 (between nodes 1 and 2) was evaluated.
The transmission power pi, was controlled by Nash equilibrium power control. It was
allowed to vary between 0dBm(1mW) and 5dBm(3.1623mW). The SINR of link 1 was
iteratively increased by β = 0.1 ratio. The power control scheme was allowed to converge
for 1 second, between SINR increases. The initial target SINR for all links was set to
γtari (0) = −7dB. The power was set to pi(0) = 0mW(0dBm).
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Figure 2. Diagram of the simulated network model
The maximum capacity value for an entire path, between source node 1 and destina-
tion node 3, was evaluated next. The SINRs of link 1 and link 2 were iteratively increased
by β = 0.1 in multiple link case. The remaining initial conditions were the same as those
in the single link case.
The capacity variation with the transmission power for the two cases (single and
multi-hop) is illustrated in Fig. 3. The maximum capacity points for the single link
and the multi-hop path cases were (3.135mW , 20.24Mbps) and (1.079mW , 15.34Mbps)
respectively. Note that, in this simulation, we have allowed to saturate transmission power
into 0dbm to 5dbm. This saturation led to the actual SINR not reaching the target value.
Hence, the capacitywas reduced if the power increased beyond themaximumpoint. Overall,
the capacity decreased by 6.57% and 21.58% for the single link and multi-hop path cases
respectively, because the power was saturated at the upper bound of the power limitation
(3.1623mW) and without feasibility to achieve the capacity targets. Consequently, the
increased interference led to not only congestion but also a reduction in the capacity.
The maximum capacity for a single link was 24.21% larger than it was for a multi-
hop scenario because increasing the entire path’s targets required that all links be included
to increase target SINR. This situation led to a power race among neighboring nodes. The
resulting increase in interference was higher here than it was in the single link case, thus
reaching the maximum transmission power for a lower SINR.
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Figure 3. Comparison of maximum capacity for both scenarios
According to this example, the topology (e.g., the density of nodes’ distribution,
operating states of each node, and the routing decision) determined themaximum achievable
link capacity. A routing decision should take into account not only the initial state (in which
both links appear to be the same) but also the actual available capacity on the link. Otherwise,
the selected path might underperform.
Overall, the maximum SINR (capacity) is a function of the topology, including
density of the nodes and the path selection, the path loss gain (G), and the target SINR of
other links representing the operating states of nodes.
SINRMax−Tar(i) = f
(
G, [SINRTar(1), ..., SINRTar(i − 1),
SINRTar(i + 1), .., SINRTar(M)]
) (1)
The dependency is not linear. Moreover, it is necessary to properly estimate available
capacities, particularly for multi-hop routing paths. The insight gained can be used as part
of a future routing scheme development to completely evaluate trade-offs among alternative
routing paths.
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4. CAPACITY ESTIMATION BASED ROUTING SCHEME
Dynamic routing is essential for communication in WANET/MANET based CPSs
due to the uncertainties and dynamics of locations of nodes, diverse devices participation
and interference from environment. Centralized routing and distributed routing schemes are
critical methods to realize dynamic routing in modern communication network. Distributed
routing typically allow nodes to make decisions locally. Each node gathers all needed
information, and bases routing decisions on this information. Centralized routing algorithms
provide a clean interface for policy specification. Global network state, including topology,
is obtained from network nodes and maintained at a centralized controller Al-Karaki and
Kamal (2004).
Inspiring by the above motivation, our goal is proposing a routing scheme which
can applied to both distributed and centralized dynamic routing in WANET/MANET CPSs.
In next part, the primary steps of the proposed scheme are illustrated. The first
subsection shows how to model the simulated network with consideration of interference
among links/paths, noises from environment, and stochastic channel fading. The following
assumptions on the simulated network are needed:
a) All transmissions in subnetwork are unidirectional. Although some bidirectional propa-
gations have been set, the target transmission is unidirectional.
b) Rayleigh channel fading is applied over time. Therefore, the gain matrix of path loss is
dynamical and time-varying.
c) The noise caused by environment factor is considered as a Gaussian white noise that is
multiplied by path loss gain matrix.
d) Only a subnetwork in a large scale network is considered. The remaining nodes, which
doesn’t participate the target transmission in the subnetwork, are conducting stable trans-
missions all the time. The interference caused by those transmissions are included into the
noise in c).
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Next, RBF neural network is designed to do capacity estimation which is a principal
guidance of route selection. At last, we separately illustrate how the proposed routing
scheme deals with the best path selection for both distributed and centralized routing
scenarios.
4.1. Modeling of Routing Path
We first introduce a traditional network-wide model of the radio links performance
in terms of signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR). The equation is rewritten with a
matrix form to calculate the required transmission power for each link when a desired SINR
is given for all links. This model will be used for generating the training data in routing
scheme design.
Certain assumptions are given here to simplify modeling and describe the network
situation that is the focus of this study.
a) The network model is a non-time varying model with stable link gains and
knowledge of the radio channel state.
b) We assume that the data transmissions are bidirectional when modeling an entire
network. If we set a network with either N nodes or hops, then M = 2(N − 1) links will be
available for communication.
The traditional approach to describing the dynamics of a wireless channel in terms
of per-link channel capacity and power usage considers a signal-to-interference-and-noise
ratio (SINR) on the particular ith link Chang et al. (2001); Chang and Yang (1997); Leung
et al. (2002); Pindoriya et al. (2008); Yun et al. (2008):
ri(t) = gii(t)pi(t)∑
j=i[gi j(t)p j(t)] + ηi(t)
(2)
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where gi j(t) is a attenuation from transmitter of j th link to receiver of the ith link, pi(t)
is transmission power on ith link, andi(t) is the channel noise on the ith link. In order to
represent the SINR equations for an entire network as matrix equation, we need to transform




[gi j(t)p j(t)] + ηi(t)]ri(t) = gii(t)pi(t) (3)
Now, we can represent the SINR for entire network as:
R[(G − GL)PT + H] = GLPT (4)
where R = det(ri(t)) is a diagonal matrix with SINR values for all links, G = [gi j]M∗M is
the channel gain matrix among all M links (from j th link transmitter to ith link receiver),
GL = [gii] is a matrix of gains on all the active links, PT = [pi]M∗1 is transmission power
vector for all M links, and H = [ηi(t)]M∗1 is vector of noise values for each link.
From network control perspective, it is more interesting to determine the necessary
transmission powers to achieved a desired, target SINR values one each link. In such a case,
we solve (3) for PT vector:
[GL(I − R) − GR]PT = RH (5)
APT = RH (6)
where Rd is diagonal matrix with the desired, target SINR values for all M links, and matrix
A = [GL(I − R) −GR] determines the existence and uniqueness of the solution. Assuming
that the inverse of A exists, the required transmission power is equal to:
PT = A−1RH (7)
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To understand the relation between the SINR variation and power variation, the
following formulation is derived by taking first partial differential of (4). ∂R (∂P) can
be considered as ∆R (∆P). Then, series of partial differential equations are rewritten in a
matrix formulation as (8).
∆R = ((G − GL) ∗ diag(P))−1(GL∆P − ((G − GL)∆P. ∗ R) (8)
where ∆R is SINR variation with power variation ∆P . The goal of RBF network is to
estimate such function for a particular link.
Without loss of generality, Rayleigh channel fading is considered here. Rayleigh
model is commonly used in wireless communication system to describe the statistical
time varying nature of the received envelope of a flat fading signal, or the envelope of








) (0 ≤ x ≤ ∞)
0 (x < 0)
(9)
where x is a random variable, and σ2 is the fading envelope of the Rayleigh distribution.
The channel uncertainties distort the transmitted signals, therefore, the uncertain effect is
represented via a channel loss gain Jagannathan et al. (2006) as:
g = f (d, n, x) = d−nx2 (10)
where d−n is the effect of path loss. n is path loss exponent, usually, n = 2 8 in typical
propagation. For Rayleigh fading, it is typical to model the power attenuation as x2 , where
x is a random variable with Rayleigh distribution. Typically the channel gain g is a function
of time.
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Figure 4. Interference along a multi-hop path
To study the interference among different links, we derived a matrix model for single
path transmission first. Based on such a model, a multi path model is presented to describe
the interactions among different paths.
Modeling for a Single Path
A signal path with N nodes is shown in Fig. 4. In more general case, there are
(N − 1) bidirectional hops in a path. Hence, there are M = 2N links with M transmitters.
The corresponding transmit power vector PT for (4) is defined as:
PT = [p1∗, p2∗, ..., pM∗]T = [P1, P2, ..., PN−1, PN, PN−1, ..., P2] (11)
where M is the total number of links in the path, N is the total number of nodes in the path.
In order to evaluate the performance along themulti-hop routing path, the multi-path
model (8) is simulated, which is employed to abstain numerical results and not essential for
the capacity analysis itself.
The distance between links i∗ and j∗ are corresponding to the distance from the





d1,1∗ d2,1∗ · · · d(M−1),1∗ dM,1∗






d1,(M−1)∗ d2,(M−1)∗ · · · d(M−1),(M−1)∗ dM,(M−1)∗
d1,M∗ d2,M∗ · · · d(M−1),M∗ dM,M∗
M∗M
(12)
where di, j denotes the distance between link i∗ and j∗ (from the position of transmitter in
i∗th link to that of the receiver in j∗th link). Combining with (10), the corresponding path
loss gain matrix is equal to:
G = f (D∗, n, x) (13)
where f (.) denotes per-element operation to apply path loss model that is the Friis trans-
mission equation.
Modeling of Multiple Paths
The presented model for a single path can be easily extended to support multiple
paths by expanding the gain matrix to include all paths.
The gain matrix for multiple paths is:
G=

Gpath1 Gpath2,path1 · · · Gpathn,path1 Gcross,path1






Gpath1,pathn Gpath2,pathn · · · Gpathn Gcross,pathn
Gpath2,cross Gpath2,cross · · · Gpathn,cross Gcross

(14)
where n denotes the number of paths. Gpathi,pathj denotes the gain matrix between path i
and j. Gcross,pathj is the gain matrix between path the cross paths and path j.
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Figure 5. Schematic diagram of RBF neural network
Remark: This step of network modeling is not essential for proposing the routing
scheme. The network model is only used to provide the data of SINR and power to train the
RBF neural network and do maximum capacity prediction in next subsection. If the data
can be taken from a real network, this step can be skipped.
4.2. RBF Based Capacity Estimation
The capacity estimation is hindered bymany external and often unpredictable factors,
including environmental noise, interference, measurement errors, and channel fading. These
factors can be considered either an uncertainty or noise for a function estimator. Hence, the
RBF neural network, which is robust in presence of uncertainties and noise, is employed for
estimating the achievable capacity curve as a function of transmission power. The limited
measured data and available information also make the RBF network more suitable than a
traditional multi-layer neural network because it is easily and quickly trained.
RBF Network Design:
The RBF neural network typically consists of three layers: an input layer, a hidden
layer, and an output layer. A radial activated function is adopted by each hidden layer
node, and the output is computed by adding together the weighted hidden unit outputs. The
structure of multi-input-single-output (MISO) RBF neural networks is depicted in Fig. 5.
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Theoretically, RBF neural networks can approximate any nonlinear function and the
feasibility of neural network to eliminate the effects of the non-target parameters on the
target parameters. With this scheme, the parameters of hidden layer kernel functions and
the output connection weights are adjusted simultaneously to minimize the output errors.
The output is a linear combination of the activation functions computed by hidden layer
weights.
The output of the j th hidden neuron can be written as





i = 1, 2, ..., n
j = 1, 2, ..., n
(15)
where h j is the output of the j th neuron, xi ∈ Rn is the input vector, c j is the kernel centers
selection using random vector, and σj is the center spread parameter.
Gaussian transfer function is used for the hidden neurons. The neurons of the output
layer have a linear transfer function. It is the weighted summation of the outputs of all




Wk jh j (16)
whereWk j is the synaptic weight connecting hidden neuron j to output neuron k and m is
the number of the hidden layer neurons.
When the maximum capacity according to (8) needs to be calculated, the path loss
gain matrix G should be known.
For capacity/SINR estimation, we assume the topology information of WANET are
known. The channel fading and other channel dynamics and uncertainties are considered,
and the main factors for estimation are the density of nodes and path selection, path loss
gain G, and target SINR of other links.
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We employ a RBF neural network to estimate function relating the used transmission
power with the resulting (achievable) capacity. The input is power of the target link since
any power changes in the network will interfere the capacity of the target link. The output
is the capacity. RBF network is trained offline first and then updated online. It has to
process a sufficient number of diverse datasets to converge to the estimated function in
offline training process. The online prediction is ready to analyze the relation of achievable
SINR (capacity) versus transmission power.
From (1) , it is clear that capacity of one link depends on all powers, not only the
power of itself. Hence, we first assume the capacity of the target link Ci is a nonlinear
function of power of each link as (17).
Ci = f (p1, p2, ..., pm, ) (17)
The function f will be estimated by RBF neural network. From (15), we define the
input is power vector x = [p1, p2, ..., pm]T (m is number of links), and the output is SINRi









Then, the weights wk j can be updated by
ŵki(k + 1) = ŵki(k) + α(Ci(k) − Ĉi(k))φ(k) (19)
When the weights converge, the future capacities versus power can be analyzed
to identify the desired operating points - the most energy efficient setting or the highest
achievable capacity - and the corresponding power values.
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Theorem: With trained by a sufficient number ofmeasured data, the RBF neural net-
work using the weight update law (19) to estimate the relationship between the transmission
power and the actual achievable capacity. The persistent excitation condition Gorinevsky
(1995) is satisfied Jagannathan et al. (2006).
Proof of weights convergence:
We denote w˜(k) = w − wˆ(k), then the estimation error can be defined as e(k) =
Ci(k) − Cˆi(k) = w˜(k)φ(k). φ(k) is the output vector from neurons.
According to PE condition, (20) can be obtained.
1 − α ||φ(k)||2 ≥ 0 (20)
We select the Lyapunov function candidate as
L = w˜T (k)w˜(k) (21)
Substitute the update law (19) into Lyapunov function candidate, we have (22).
∆L = w˜T (k + 1)w˜(k + 1) − w˜T (k)w˜(k)
= (wT − w˜T (k + 1))(w − w˜(k + 1)) − w˜T (k)w˜(k)
= (w˜T (k) − αφT (k)eT (k))(w˜(k) − αe(k)φ(k)) − w˜T (k)w˜(k)
= w˜T (k)w˜(k) − αφT (k)eT (k)w˜(k)
− αw˜T (k)e(k)φ(k) + α2φT (k)eT (k)e(k)φ(k) − w˜T (k)w˜(k)
≤ −2α ||φ(k)|| ||e(k)|| ||w˜(k)|| + α2 ||φ(k)||2 ||e(k)||2
≤ −2α ||φ(k)||2 ||w˜(k)||2 + α2 ||φ(k)||4 ||w˜(k)||2
≤ −α ||φ(k)||2 ||w˜(k)||2(2 − α ||φ(k)||2)
(22)
Combiningwith PE condition andα is positive definite,∆L is negative semi-definite.
The weights are bounded.
28
4.3. Route Decision
The proposed routing scheme can be applied to both distributed and centralized
dynamic routing in WANET/MANET CPSs. The achievable capacity is estimated for
single link in distributed routing and entire path in centralized routing respectively. The
following part separately illustrate how the proposed routing scheme deals with the best
path selection for both distributed and centralized routing scenarios.
Distributed Dynamic Routing Scenario
In distributed dynamic routing scenario, the proposed scheme is applied to a peer-to-
peer communication case. Nodes located between source and destination can be considered
as multi-point relays (MPR) which can select the next MPR individually. The next relay
candidate has to be achievable and within the communication range of the current relay.
When the “Hello” message is send out by the current relay, the maximum capacity for each
alternative link is essentially estimated with the RBF neural network. Then, a table about
the achievable capacity for each alternative link is generated at the current relay. The routing
decision is made and the principal message is transmitted through the link with the highest
capacity.
Centralized Dynamic Routing Scenario
An end-to-end routing example is taken. The source node have to know all of
alternative paths, then make the routing decision properly. Capacity prediction for end-to-
end transmission is more complicated than peer-to-peer case since the “bottleneck” link is
able to put down the capacity of the entire path. Therefore, keeping all capacity of each
link at a same level is a big challenge for power control and capacity estimation.
To deal with this challenge, a capacity synchronization combining a Nash equilib-
rium power control is proposed (Fig. 6). The capacity of the first link named C1, which is
conducted by the source node and the next relay candidate, is estimated by a RBF neural
network. Then, it is the desired value of other links’ capacities (C2,C3, ...CN , N is the
number of link in this path). The power controller force the C2,C3, ...CN reach C1. Such a
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Figure 6. Control schematic
scheme can ensure the capacity consistency in a path and effectively avoid the “bottleneck”
situation. A table is only generated at the source node. The routing decision is made, and
the path with the best achievable capacity will take the message transmission.
5. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the proposed routing scheme is evaluated by two scenarios with
considering a Rayleigh channel fading and noise from environment. The training data are
collected when the source node broadcast the "Hello" message. The simulated network is
shown in Fig. 7. Twenty nodes with different transmission ranges are randomly scattered
in the plate. The power limitation is 0.01mW 3.1623mW(0 5dBm). The initial powers are
1mW .
Node 1 is the source and Node 4 is the destination. For this particular communica-
tion, we can extract a subnetwork that only has six nodes conducting sixteen links shown
as Fig. 8. Node 2, 5 and Node 3, 6 are considered as second and third relays respectively.
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Figure 7. Network topology
Figure 8. Sub-network topology schematic
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Figure 9. RBF network prediction for Link 1
Each node is free to choose the next relay in its transmission range. Therefore, it is possible
that some of links will conduct cross routing. In Fig. 8, there are four paths from Node 1
to Node 4 including Path 1 : 1, 2, 3, 4; Path 2 : 1, 2, 6, 4, Path 3 : 1, 5, 3, 4; Path 4 : 1, 5, 3, 4.
5.1. Routing for Peer-to-Peer Transmission
The channel fading and environmental factors lead to a fluctuation on the capacity
shown as Fig. 9. Moreover, in order to do accurate estimation, the averaged value for
each variable is taken. After excluding the wrong data point, the existing data provides the
capacity values corresponding to power value from 0.01mW to 1.4mW .
Fig. 9 show the predicted curve (the blue curve) comparing with the collected (the
green curve) and simulated curve (the red curve). The green curve has covered a part of
power series, then we also need to obtain the rest curve by increasing power manually so
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Figure 10. RBF network prediction for Link 7
that we can check if the predicted curve can catch the simulated curve. In Fig. 9, it can be
seen that the actual maximum capacity 3.507 ∗ 106bps occur at P1 = 2.377mW . Likewise,
the maximum capacity is 3.533 ∗ 106bps at 2.9mW estimated by RBF neural network.
As shown in the results, it concludes that the RBF neural network can predict the
capacity vs. the corresponding power curves. Therefore, the source learns how many
powers should be putted in so that the best communication performance can be achieved.
It also reduce the control input as well as improve the efficiency of the power usage.
Following the proposed prediction, all maximum capacity values of all links can be
known. In this scenario, we first estimate the capacity of both Link 1 (from Node 1 to Node
2) shown in Fig. 9 and Link 7 (from Node 1 to Node 5) shown in Fig. 10. Then which node
is the next relay can be decided by comparing the maximum achievable capacities. It can
be seen that the predicted value of Link 1 (3.533 ∗ 106bps) is 0.546 ∗ 106bps bigger than
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Figure 11. RBF network prediction for Link 2
Link 7’s. Therefore, Link 1 is the better route to handle the communications. If Node 2 is
the second relay, Node 3 will continuous to do the evaluation for the third relay selection
shown as Fig. 11 that is for Link 2.
Following the proposed procedure, the each relay node can gather the local infor-
mation shown in Table. 1. The simulated values are calculated based on the complete
information about system dynamics including path loss gain, Rayleigh channel fading,
and disturbance. However, the predicted values are estimated based on typically available
measurement data. For instance, the traffic from Node 1 to Node 4 could select several
alternative paths. The RBF neural network predictor allows us to identify the best path is
1 − 2 − 3 − 4 which is same as simulated result.
Table. 1 shows the capacities with the upper bound power. The maximum power
does not correspond to the actual maximum achievable capacity for every link. Therefore
the accurate approximation of the relationship between power and capacity can be employed








































































































































































































































































































Figure 12. Pre-training RBF network prediction for Link 1
Remark: The initial values of the weights and kernel centers are random vectors in
the above simulations. Consequently, more samples should be used to turn the parameters of
RBF neural network. Therefore, if the neural network can use a pre-trained initial parameter
instead of random one, the training time will be reduced as well as number of samples.
Fig. 12 shows the pre-training performance. The data taken from network is changed
over time since the channel fading and random noise are time varying. We assume Case A
is the estimation of time k, and Case B is for time k + 1. The trained parameter of Case A is
considered as the initial condition for Case B. The network is re-trained with small number
of samples in Case B. Table.2 shows the parameters of neural network are slightly turned
and the prediction is accurate with a small prediction error 2.25%. In addition, pretraining
of RBF network with simulated data improved convergence of the function estimation by
70.31%. Therefore, pretraining is a good way to fast turning process and reduces sampling
times.
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Table 2. Turned parameters for Case A and B
Parameter Case A Case B
Weights
[-0.0648, 0.2517, [-0.0792, 0.2384,
0.0642, -0.0011, 0.0482,-0.0127,
0.0566, 0.1225] 0.0430, 0.1115]
Centers
[-2.4405,-12.6408, [-2.4405,-12.6408,
-0.4779, 4.1909, -0.4461, 4.1909,
-6.5563, 3.0526] -6.5563, 3.0526]
Table 3. Maximum capacity for all alternative paths
Distance between Predicted Max Simulated Max Prediction
Origin and Node 1 Capacity (×106bps) Capacity (×106bps) Error (%)
0.05 8.597 8.195 4.91
0.1 8.399 8.095 3.76
0.15 8.292 7.877 5.29
0.2 8.214 7.719 6.41
0.25 8.111 7.563 7.25
0.3 7.944 7.421 7.05
0.35 7.907 7.243 9.17
0.4 7.836 7.197 8.88
0.45 7.725 7.057 9.47
0.5 7.468 6.998 6.72
By using pre-training, we extended RBF neural network prediction to do routing
in mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) scenario. Fig. 12 shows the prediction performance
when Node 1 was departing from origin. The data collected at Node 1 locating at origin are
used to pre-train the RBF neural network. The convergedweights were recorded and applied
as the initial values at the next time turning. The tendency of actual and predicted curve
are identical. The prediction errors shown in Table. 3 do not exceed 9.47%. Moreover, the
number of the returning samples is decreased 45% at least.
5.2. Routing for End-to-End Transmission
In next simulations, we apply the proposed estimation for Path 1 − 2 − 6 − 4. Due
to the all capacity in the path should be same, a Nash equilibrium controller is used.
37
Figure 13. RBF neural network prediction for Link 1
The first link of each path is the leader link whose capacity should be followed by
other links. With the proposed capacity synchronization scheme, the predicted Capacity 1
is the desired capacity of other capacities, then inputted into power controller to calculate
control inputs.
Three RBF neural networks are used for function prediction for each link. Compar-
ing three capacities at each power value, the maximum capacity is taken as the final capacity
of the path.
Although the prediction error of each link cannot be avoided, the path capacity
prediction is accurate with only 4.73% (0.126 ∗ 106bps) error.
Table. 4 shows the achievable capacities of all alternative paths fromNode 1 to Node
4. The RBF neural network predictor allows us to identify the best path is Path 1− 2− 3− 4
which is same as simulated result.
We also conducted the same experiments as peer-to-peer scenario to test the per-
formance of the proposed routing scheme in MANET based CPSs. Fig. 15 shows that
the accuracy of the prediction for MANET scenario have the prediction errors without
exceeding 3.07% shown in Table. 5.
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Figure 14. RBF neural network prediction for Path 1 − 2 − 6 − 4
Table 4. Maximum capacity for all alternative paths
Predicted Max Simulated Max PredictionPath Capacity (×106bps) Capacity (×106bps) Error (%)
1-2-3-4 5.28 5.239 0.78
1-2-6-4 2.79 2.644 4.73
1-5-6-4 3.92 4.07 3.67
1-5-3-4 3.34 3.325 0.42
Figure 15. RBF neural network prediction for mobile network
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Table 5. Maximum capacity for all alternative paths
Distance between Predicted Max Simulated Max Prediction
Origin and Node 1 Capacity (×106bps) Capacity (×106bps) Error (%)
0.05 2.434 2.488 2.22
0.1 2.479 2.477 1.29
0.15 2.462 2.474 0.49
0.2 2.419 2.412 0.29
0.25 2.385 2.366 0.80
0.3 2.376 2.336 1.68
0.35 2.347 2.286 2.60
0.4 2.343 2.271 3.07
0.45 2.300 2.252 2.09
0.5 2.269 2.256 0.57
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel capacity estimation based routing scheme is proposed for
optimizing communication performance in WANET/MANET based CPSs. The simulation
results show that the proposed capacity estimation routing scheme can select the most
optimal path/link with the highest capacity to ensure the vital message can be delivered
safely, effectively, and high-quality. In addition, the proposed scheme is flexible to apply
for distributed and centralized routing problems.
For peer-to-peer scenario, which is a typical distributed routing example, the RBF
NN based capacity prediction can accurately estimate the maximum achievable capacity
based on local measurements. The observed error in estimation is less than 4% of predicted
throughput. The power setting that maximizes capacity and energy-efficiency can be iden-
tified using the RBF estimated function of capacity with transmission power. Comparing
with simulated data, the selected route matches the expected one. Moreover, with the
pre-training technique, the convergence of the RBF neural network is improved by 70.31%.
Such an improvement can also adapt to topology changes caused by some moving nodes in
MANET based CPSs, and its prediction error does not exceed 10%.
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For end-to-end scenario, the proposed scheme combining with a novel capacity
synchronization technique (Fig. 6) is used to deal with a centralized routing problem. The
simulation results illustrate that the maximum capacity of multi-hop paths is accurately
predicted with avoidance of “bottleneck” situation. The route selections based on the
predicted and simulated data are identical and the prediction errors are lower than 4.73%.
Furthermore, the proposed scheme can be applied to routing selection in MANET based
CPSs. The prediction errors is lower than 3.07%.
In summary, the proposed routing scheme is a flexible and adaptive method to be
applied on diverse dynamic routing issues in WANET/MANET base CPSs. Meanwhile,
it is robust to against interference, interactions and environmental noises in a large scale
CPS. Taking the advantage of advanced routing schemes is a vital part for improving the
robustness, reliability, safety, and security of communication in WANET/MANET based
CPSs. For future work, the security issues during transmission will be addressed by
improving the proposed routing scheme.
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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) refer to systems with integrated computational, net-
work, and physical components. With the increasing connectivity among computational
cyber connected elements and the physical entities, capturing the interrelationship between
the cyber and the physical systems becomes increasingly important. Especially, this in-
timate coupling between the cyber and physical systems will result in fault propagation
from the embedded cyberspace to the physical system. In this paper, a novel cyber network
fault diagnosis scheme is proposed to detect and isolate cyber and physical system faults.
Additionally, a fault resilience control is designed to mitigate the degradation of system
performance when cyber network faults occur and propagate over physical components.
Keywords: cyber physical system, fault diagnosis, network fault, resilience
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern industrial systems, such as smart grid, healthcare, automotive control sys-
tems are implemented as distributed event-triggered control systems wherein the control
loops are connected by a real-time communication network with limited resources. Such
systems are referred to Cyber-physical Systems (CPSs) which offer many advantages: the
ease of maintenance and installation, flexibility, and low cost. However, limited resources
and constraints of the embedded communication network create challenges for a control
system stability. For example, changing topology or background traffic result in varied
delays, packet losses, and quantization over time. In addition, cyber attacks including
denial-of-service, spoofing, and eavesdropping, can degrade the system performance. For
example, delays exceeding the range assumed for the controller due to jamming cyber attack
lead to the control signal arriving too late for the actuator to take appropriate actions. Con-
sequently, system outputs deviate from the desired trajectory and the entire CPS becomes
unstable. Therefore, an optimal networked resilience controller design for CPSs is needed.
It has to mitigate the negative effects of the network uncertainties and dynamics on the CPS
performance.
Many existing works on cyber security Xie et al. (2014) - Mitchell and Chen (2016)
proposed network schemes to defend against the cyber attacks without modification to
the controller design. In contrast, other researchers focused on fault tolerant controller
design to improve resilience against physical component faults Gao and Chen (2008)-
Tiberi et al. (2013). In these works, the network dynamics and uncertainties are often
oversimplified under strong assumptions: a) the delays are bounded within a specific range;
b) the distribution of delays and package losses are known and time-invariant. However,
in realistic CPSs, the delay can easily exceed such restrictive bounds and lead to unstable
system. The unexpected variation in delay leads to the malfunction or overreaction on the
controller and actuator, and eventually instability of the entire CPSs. Therefore, relaxing
these assumptions should be addressed to improve the resilience of CPSs.
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In this paper, a PDF-based tuning of stochastic optimal controller (PTSOC) is
developed to address the degraded system performance induced by network uncertainties
including attacks, transmission faults, and channel dynamics. This relaxes the earlier
mentioned strong assumptions a) and b) made in existing works. A stochastic systemmodel,
which includes stochastic parameters that represents network dynamics, is employed. A
KDE-based online PDF identifier is proposed to capture the variation of network dynamics.
The probabilities of delays provided by the PDF identifier are used to tune the control law. In
addition, the system stability is mathematically analysed using Lyapunov approach. Overall,
the proposed approach improves the robustness, optimizes cost of regulation, prevents the
physical components from unrepairable damages, and keeps the CPS working within the
desired operating condition.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the related works and motivation
are briefly discussed. The proposed controller design in terms of PDF identifier and stability
analysis are presented in Section 3. Section 5 illustrates the effectiveness of the proposed
controller through simulations in MATLAB. Section 6 gives the conclusion.
2. MOTIVATION AND RELATEDWORKS
The embedded cyberspace imposes restrictions on the exchange of information in
CPSs, such a limited channel capacity and traffic congestions. Malicious cyber attacks
further restrict the information delivery. The delay and packet loss caused by the above
restrictions are stochastic with unknown bounds and difficult to predict. Importantly, they
have a potentially negative effect on the performance and stability of CPSs. For example,
inappropriate control actions caused by increasing delay lead to a big overshoot as well as
more actuation cost to manage such overshoot.
A following example shows that the network dynamics significantly affect the per-
formance of CPS and the existing control approaches may fail to guarantee its stability.
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This scenario emulates a route hijacking by an attacker to eavesdrop control in-
formation (data integrity). Such a route hijacking increases delay and delay variation on
the longer path. A network is simulated using Network Simulator 2 (NS2) with a random
topology of 11 nodes. Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing scheme is
adopted. The route through the topology is altered during the simulation such that the
packet delays vary for the controller loop, as shown in Fig. 1. Note, that similar network
performance could be a result of topology or traffic pattern changes.
The results show the disturbance in CPS introduced by the network dynamics. With
these delays, a PID controller is simulated for a simple 2I4O (two input four output) system
Xu et al. (2012). Fig. 2 shows PID make the system states converge when delay bound is
low before 6s. Then, the sudden changes of delay at k = 6s, 16s, and 20s make the system
states vibrate. Consequently, the CPS becomes unstable due to such dynamics of delay.
The attack changes the delay distribution. This stochastic disturbance increases the
probability that the system becomes uncontrollable and unstable. Therefore, it is necessary
to include such dynamics both in system model and controller design.
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Figure 2. System performance with a PID controller
2.1. Literature Review
The following literature review discusses the existing approaches that address the
uncertain dynamics of network, especially long time delays and packet losses, either in
network or physical system.
Many researchers developed network protocols and tools Xie et al. (2014) - Mitchell
and Chen (2016) to keep delays and packet losses within traditional controller constraints.
The controller design of physical systems is not modified in these works. Such approaches
can maintain system stability if the network configuration is simple and fixed. Designing
more complicated networks and systems under cyber attacks becomes challenging if not
impossible due to restrictive constraints dictated by the physical controller. Xie et al. (2014)
proposed a channel estimation approach to calculate the packet success rate, the worst-case
packet delay and average energy consumption based on acknowledgement (ACK) informa-
tion. However, the worst-case delay has a upper bound known a priori while the system
model is linear time invariant and not stochastic. Lee et al. (2005) proposed a quality-of-
service based remote control scheme for CPSs via the Profibus token passing protocol. They
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used the time delay data provided by transmitting the real-time messages to approximate
the delays for high-priority and low-priority messages. They assumed a strong condition
that the network delay has time invariant lower and upper bounds. The control schemes in
above literature are valid if the delays are bounded within the acceptable range. However, if
the configuration of the embedded network becomes complicated, dynamic, and stochastic,
the bound constraints cannot be met. For instant, in intelligent transportation systems (ITS),
moving vehicles exchange their information with other vehicles, transportation management
system, and users. Such a complicated and dynamic network results in delays and packet
losses exceeding their bounds because of interference from the environment and network
topology changes. Thus the controller cannot guarantee the stability of CPSs. Overall, a
more robust approach should consider network dynamics in controller design to relax the
constraints.
Simultaneously, other researchers had designed several controllers to address stochas-
tic network dynamics under strong constrains. Gao and Chen (2008), Gao et al. (2008)
modelled a CPS as a sampled-data system and solved a set of linear matrix inequalities to
derive the feedback gain of a memory-less controller. The dynamics in the cyberspace are
simplified as known bounded delays. Similarly, Hao and Zhao (2010), Tian et al. (2010),
Liu et al. (2007) proposed networked controllers by using Lyapunov stability analysis with
a priori knowledge of the delay bounds. Moreover, Tiberi et al. (2013) proposed a self-
triggered sampling for achieving substantial reduction of communication traffic. The system
stability can be guaranteed under certain assumptions: a) the measurements are sent to the
central node within a bounded time delay; b) The system states have to converge initially.
All these works considered the network delay issues in various perspective. However, they
commonly assumed the network delay had a known bound and the distribution of delay
was fixed. Such schemes would fail in realistic CPSs where delay bound is unknown before
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hand. For instance, new communication nodes generating new traffics will increase the
upper bound which cannot be known ahead of time. Furthermore, dynamics of the delay
distribution make the entire system unstable.
2.2. Explicit Modeling of Delay and Packet Losses
Xu et al. (2012) made a significant progress when they included the random param-
eters representing network dynamics in system model. All of system matrices and control
input calculation concurrently change as network delays and packet losses randomly change.
This model is the prototype we used in the proposed PTSOC design.
The conventional discrete time model was described as following Blundell and
Duncan (1998):













where xk = x(kT) denotes system states; As = eAT , Bk0 =
∫ Ts
dk0
eA(Ts−t)dt, and Bki =∫ dk
i−1−(i−1)Ts
dki −iTs
eA(Ts−t)dt ∀i = 1, 2, ..., d are the system matrices.
Xu et al. (2012) derived the stochastic model expressed as
zk+1 = Azk zk + Bzkuk, (2)
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where zk = [xTk uTk−1 · · · uTk−d]T is the state variables vector; and Azk, Bzk are the time-
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uk is the control input; γki and γk−i are binary random variables representing the
package reception status. (if the package is received, γ = 1, otherwise, γ = 0)





(zTmQzzm + uTmRzum)] k = 0, 1, 2, · · · (3)
where Qz = diag
{
Q, R/d, · · · }, and Rz = R/d are symmetric positive semi-definite and
symmetric positive definite respectively. E(•) is the expected operator of ∑∞m=k(zTmQzzm +
uTmRzum).
Although the above model included the terms of network dynamics, the SOC only
indirectly considers such dynamics through the stochastic model. It also has a strong
assumption that the delay distribution is fixed. System performance becomes suboptimal
when the above assumptions are invalidated by changes in bounds or distribution as observed
in simulations for cases B and C in Section 5.
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2.3. Capturing Network Dynamics
To relax the bounds and distribution constraints, the system model and the control
law should be tuned based on current probabilities of delays. Therefore, a PDF estimation
is needed.
For estimation of delay probabilities, several PDF identification methods exist in
literature, such as histogram, KDE, and Maximum likelihood estimation Silverman (1986).
The advantage of KDE is more accurate estimation with fewer samples than other methods.
Offline KDE has been used in various applications, including computer graphics Hurter
et al. (2012), image processing Bors and Nasios (2009), Calabrese and Zenga (2010),
Blundell and Duncan (1998), and Elgammal et al. (2003), and industrial process He et al.
(2015), Chen et al. (2014). He et al. (2015) introduced a novel KDE based framework
for nonlinear metric learning, Kernel density metric learning (KDML). This method has
been successfully applied in face recognition. Elgammal et al. (2003) investigated the use
of Fast Gauss Transform for efficient computation of KDE techniques for computer vision
applications. Chen et al. (2014) proposed a KDE based method to estimate the spatial
intensity of false alarms for multi-target tracking system. Additionally, KDE Silverman
(1986) is suitable for PDF identification in CPS because it can handle different types of
distributions, such as mixture distribution and Poisson distribution. In contrast, the other
approaches only work for normal distributions. In Section 3.2, an online KDE estimator is
introduced. It can estimate unknown PDF with a good accuracy and adapt to the dynamic
changes of delay distribution. Then, the provided PDF information is used to tune the
PTSOC control law. Hence, the controller adapts to the given network dynamics.
The proposed PTSOC relaxes the bounds and distribution constraints through in-
cluding PDF information in controller design. Next, the details of the proposed PTSOC are
presented.
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3. PROPOSED PDF-BASED TUNING OF STOCHASTIC OPTIMAL CONTROL
(PTSOC) DESIGN
In this section, the overview of the proposed control scheme is given. The PDF-
based tuning of stochastic optimal control (PTSOC) scheme with an online PDF estimator
is introduced. The online KDE based PDF identifier is introduced in Section 3.2. Then,
PTSOC is derived from the proposed cost function 4 in Section 3.3.
3.1. Overview
PTSOC takes into account uncertain network dynamics by applying online KDE to
capture PDF variation of delays and tuning its control law based on the PDF information.
The overall architecture of the proposed control system is shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3. Overall architecture of stochastic CPS with PDF identifier
The proposed PTSOC includes three main steps that are continuous repeated:
a) Data collection of delays. n delays ([dk−n+1, · · · , dk]) in the sliding window are
used to do the PDF estimation at time k (PDFk). When new delay is measured, the data in
the sliding window is updated.
b) PDF estimation. The PDF of these n delays is obtained. The probability for each
delay interval is calculated.
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c) PTSOC law calculation. For each delay interval, the cost function (5) and the
optimal control law (8) are derived from (3). The cost function of PTSOC defined by (4)
is a probability weighted sum of the cost functions for all delay intervals. Similarly, the
PTSOC law derived in Section. 3.3 is the summation of the weighted SOC laws of delay

















where dint represents the delay interval that we take 0.1s in the simulation section. If
dint < dk < dint(i + 1), dk is classified in ith delay case; n is the total number of delay cases;
k represents sampling interval; Pi is probability of delay within dinti to dint(i + 1) provided
by the KDE-based PDF identifier; x is states vector; ui is control inputs vector; Qi and Ri
are weighted constants of states and control inputs, respectively.
Remark 1: The cost function of PTSOC is more generalized than that of SOC. SOC
only considers the worst delay case that is dint < dk < dint(i + 1), Pi = 1, and Pj = 0, j , i.
In such a case, the PTSOC cost function (7) becomes SOC (3).
As the probabilities of each possible delay changes, PTSOC continuously tracks
the network dynamics with a PDF identifier and updates its parameters based on PDF
information of delay to adapt to the given system situation.
3.2. PDF Identifier
To capture the dynamics of network delays, an online KDE-based PDF identifier
is proposed to iteratively estimate the distribution. The data used to do identification is
updated every sampling interval for a window of n last packet delays. The main steps of
online PDF identification are shown in Table. 1. Here, a normal kernel smoother is selected
for PDF estimation.
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Table 1. Online PDF identification algorithm
1. Determining the data in the sliding window for time k:
a) Choosing a kernel function K centered on τ with a bandwidth h;
b) Each observation τi receives a specific weight proportional to the
scaled distance from the observation τi to τ, which is
u = (τ − τi)/h;
c) At a given τ, the estimate is found by vertically summing up over
the k shapes.
This can be synthesized as:
f̂ (τ) = 1nhτi ∈ [τ − h2, τ + h2 ]
The general formula for KDE will be given by
f̂k(τ) = 1nh
∑n
i=1 K( τ−τih )
where the dependence of the estimate on the kernel function K(.)
is denoted as f̂k .
2. Updating the new data for time k + 1 in the sliding window and go
back to Step 1;
Remark 2: With a large window size, KDE provides an accurate estimation of
PDF with neglectable bias Gisbert (2003). In this paper, we estimate PDF of n samples
in the sliding window. Such that the estimation error is guaranteed to converge to a small
value denoted as dKDE . The effect of dKDE on the regulation error convergence is shown in
Theorem 3.
3.3. Optimal Controller Design with Consideration of Dynamics of Delay Distribution
In this subsection, PDF identification is employed to develop a novel stochastic
optimal controller for CPSs while considering stochastic dynamics of network. First, we
derived a time-varying system matrices that explicitly include probability information of
delays. Each element of the matrices is derived. Then, PTSOC is proposed based on
the time-driven sensing and event-driven actuating controller framework. The maximum
number of control input that effects system matrices is d. Only the latest control input is
allowed to act on the controlled plant when several control inputs are received at the same
time Xu et al. (2012).
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In the stochastic model (2), all of the candidate models (dynamic matrices Azki and
Bzki) and their corresponding probabilities depend on the γki values and their probabilities.
γk0 corresponds to control input with the delay less than sampling period (Ts). γ
k
i (k = 1, 2, d)
is determined by γk−1i−1 . Therefore, γ
k




i . The probability Pγki can
be determined by Pdk>Ts . (5) denotes the probability for each γi.
γk0 =

0 i f dk > Ts, the corresponding probability Pγk0=0 = Pdk>Ts
1 i f dk < Ts, the corresponding probability Pγk0=1 = Pdk<Ts
γk1 =

0 i f dk < Ts, dk < dk−1 − Ts, Pγk1 = Pdk>TsPdk−1<TsPdk<dk−1−Ts
1

i f dk > Ts, dk−1 > Ts

dk < dk−1 − Ts,
Pγk1=1 = Pdk>TsPdk−1<TsPdk<dk−1−Ts
dk > dk−1 − Ts,
Pγk1=1 = Pdk>TsPdk−1<TsPdk>dk−1−Ts
i f dk < Ts,

dk−1 > Ts, dk > dk−1 − Ts,
Pγk1=1 = Pdk<TsPdk−1>TsPdk>dk−1−Ts











where Pdint i<dk<dint (i+a) =
∫ dint (i+a)
dint i
f (x)dx, dint is delay bandwidth.
All of the probabilities in (5) can be obtained from the PDF identifier. The data in
the sliding window maps the PDF and provide the probabilities of delays in different ranges
P(dki ), P(dk−1i ), · · · , P(dk−di ). The probability of delays can be denoted as P(γk0 = i) and
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P(γki = i). Then, it is easy to obtain the probabilities of each possible Bki based on the above
information. Finally, a set of candidate stochastic models Azki and Bzki are defined. The
corresponding control law (candidate control law) for each candidate model (6) is obtained
by optimizing its corresponding cost function (7). Each candidate cost function has its
optimal parameters Qzi and Rzi for the corresponding control law derivation. The final
proposed control law (8) is a weighted sum of these candidate control laws, with weights
that are equal to the corresponding probabilities from the PDF identifier.
dinti < dk < dint(i + 1)
=

i = 1 u1k = −K1k z1k, K1k = (BTzk1z1kBzk1 + Rzk)−1(BTzk1z1kAzk1 + Sz1k)
i = 2 u2k = −K2k z2k, K2k = (BTzk2z2kBzk2 + Rzk)−1(BTzk2z2kAzk2 + Sz2k)
...

















where Kik is the optimal gain when dinti < dk < dint(i + 1) at k, Ji is the corresponding cost
function.









where Kk is the optimal gain and uk is the control input. Szik ≥ 0 is the solution to the ARE.
nd = dupper/dint , dupper is the maximum delay in the sliding window; Pki is the probability
of dinti < dk < dint(i + 1).
PTSOC, which considers PDF of delays, is able to optimize the trade-off between
system state error and cost of regulation. Its control law is more accurate for the given
network situation than that of SOC because the weights of each candidate control law are
continuously updated to reflect the actual PDF of delays. In contrast, SOC considers only
one of delay cases in 7 in optimization.
4. STABILITY ANALYSIS
Three theorems and their corresponding proofs are presented to demonstrate stability
of the proposed PTSOC. Lyapunov based stability analysis is used. Theorems 1 and 2
demonstrate asymptotic convergence of regulation error and estimation error of the control
gain. Theorem 3 shows uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) stability of the regulation
error when the irremovable bias of PDF estimation exists.
In Theorem 1, the control law tuned by probability information guarantees the
asymptotic convergence for regulation error with an assumption that delay PDFs are accu-
rately estimated without bias. Theorem 2 relaxes the assumption in Theorem 1. It shows
the control gain estimation asymptotically converges even if PDF estimation has an error
provided it asymptotically converges to zero. Theorem 3 considers the irremovable bias of
PDF estimation as a bounded disturbance. However, an UUB stability is guaranteed.
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Theorem 1: (Asymptotic stability of regulation error with a perfect PDF estima-
tion). Given the initial conditions as the system state z0 and system matrices Az0, and Bz0,
let u0(zk) be an initial admissible control policy for the CPS (1). Let the control update law
be given by (8) with properly selected Qzm and Rzm. Let the PDF estimation be a no error
estimation. Then, there exists a constant Kmax satisfying Kmax ≤ (1 − a)/b such that the
regulation error of system states converge to zero asymptotically in the mean.
Proof
Consider the following positive definite Lyapunov function candidate: Vzk = zTk zk .
zk is the state vector of k.
The systemmatrices are time varying and stochastic, therefore, we consider ∆Vzkm =
Vzk+1m−Vzkm for each possible systemmatrices ( Azkm and Bzkm). m represents the number of
the candidate systems. If the maximum value of ∆Vzkm is negative definite, the convergence
of system states is proved.
∆Vzkm = Vzk+1m − Vzk
= (Azkmzk + Bzkmuk)T (Azkmzk + Bzkmuk) − zTk zk
=‖ Azkmzk + Bzkmuk ‖2 − ‖ zk ‖2
=‖ Azkmzk − Bzkm
nd∑
i=1
PikKik zk ‖2 − ‖ zk ‖2
=
( ‖ Azkmzk − Bzkm nd∑
i=1
PikKik ‖2 −1




{(‖ Azkm ‖ + ‖ Bzkm ‖‖ Kk ‖)2 − 1} ‖ zk ‖2
≤ {(‖ Azkm ‖ + ‖ Bzkm ‖ Kmax)2 − 1} ‖ zk ‖2
≤ {(amax + bmaxKmax)2 − 1} ‖ zk ‖2
∀k = 1, 2, · · ·
∀m = 1, 2, · · · , nd
Kmax = max
{ ‖ K1 ‖, ‖ K2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Knd ‖ }
= max
{ ‖ (BTzkizmiBzki + Rzk)−1(BTzkizmiAzki + Szk) ‖ },
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , nd,
where Az j and Bz j are the system matrices of j. K j is the control gain of j. Kmax is the
maximum control gain of k. nd is the number of system matrices case. amax = max
{ ‖
Azk1 ‖, ‖ Azk2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Azkm ‖} is the upper bound of ‖ Azkm ‖, and bmax = max
{ ‖ Bzk1 ‖
, ‖ Bzk2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Bzkm ‖
}
is the upper bound of ‖ Bzkm ‖.
We define a = maxa1, a2, · · · , and and b = maxb1, b2, · · · , bnd . Qzm and Rzm
are selected properly Carnevale et al. (2007). Since Vzkm is positive definite and ∆Vzkm
is negative definite provided Kmax is selected as above. Therefore, the regulation error
converges to zero asymptotically.
Next, the assumption that PDF estimation has no bias is relaxed with Theorem 2.
The control gain estimation error still has an asymptotic convergence.
Theorem 2 (Control gain estimation error convergence): As the delay data keeps
updating PDF identifier and
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 is satisfied, then the
estimation error for control gain ‖ K˜k ‖ asymptotically converges to zero.
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Proof
First, we define the estimation error of control gain K as K˜k = Kk − K̂k =∑n
j=1 Pk jK j −
∑n
j=1 P̂k jK j . Pi j is the actual probability at k. Then, Lyapunov function
candidate is VKk = K˜Tk K˜k .
∆VKk = VKk+1 − VKk
= K˜Tk+1K˜k+1 − K˜Tk K˜k




P(k+1) jK j −
nd∑
j=1
P̂(k+1) jK j)T (
nd∑
j=1







Pk jK j −
nd∑
j=1
P̂k jK j)T (
nd∑
j=1







(P(k+1) j − P̂(k+1) j)K j ‖2 − ‖
nd∑
j=1




P˜(k+1) jK j ‖2 − ‖
nd∑
j=1




P˜(k+1) jK j ‖ + ‖
nd∑
j=1
P˜k jK j ‖
)
︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
( ‖ nd∑
j=1
P˜(k+1) jK j ‖ − ‖
nd∑
j=1






P˜(k+1) jK j ‖ − ‖
nd∑
j=1
P˜k jK j ‖
)
= ∆1[(‖ P˜(k+1)1 ‖ − ‖ P˜k1 ‖) ‖ K1 ‖ + ‖ P˜(k+1)2 ‖ − ‖ P˜k2 ‖) ‖ K2 ‖ + · · ·








) ‖ Kmax ‖
∆1 > 0,Kmax = max
{
K1,K2, · · · ,Knd
}
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SinceVKk is positive definite and ∆VKk is negative definite provided K˜k = Kk − K̂k =∑n
j=1 Pk jK j −
∑n
j=1 P̂k jK j . Therefore, the estimation error of control gain asymptotically
converge to zero.
Remark 3: Monotonically decreased estimation error for each delay range (‖
P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ P˜k j ‖< 0) is not a necessary condition. The convergence only requires the
estimation error of the entire PDF (
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0) monotonically
decreasing over time. The maximum error occurs when the first sample of the new distri-
bution comes in the sliding window. Then the accuracy of PDF estimation improves as the
sliding window includes more and more new samples from the new distribution after the
PDF change occurs. Therefore,
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 holds.
Theorem 2 considers an ideal case where the PDF estimation error converge to
zero. In realistic case, there is an irremovable bias due to the finite sliding window size.
Theorem 3 shows the UUB convergence of the regulation error in such a case.
Theorem 3: (UUB Stability of the Regulation Error). Given the initial conditions
as the system state z0 and system matrices Az0, and Bz0, let u0(zk) be an initial admissible
control policy for the CPS (1). Let the control update law be given by (8) and if the
disturbance induced by the irremovable bias of PDF estimation has a bound ‖ dKDE ‖ and
Kmin < 1/bmin such that the regulation error of system states has an uniformly ultimate
bounded convergence in the mean.
Proof
Consider the following positive definite Lyapunov function candidate: Vzk = zTK zk .
zk is the state vector of k. The corresponding estimated Lyapunov is V̂zk , therefore, ∆V̂zk =
V̂zk+1 − V̂zk . Similar to proof of Theorem 1, we consider ∆V̂zkm = V̂z(k+1)m − V̂zk for each
possible system matrices (Azkm and Bzkm). m represents one of the possible cases. If
the maximum value of ∆V̂zkm is negative definite, the system convergence is proved. The
irremovable bias of PDF estimation is considered the system state disturbance dk bounded
by dM .
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∆V̂zkm = V̂zk+1m − V̂zkm
=‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖2 − ‖ zk ‖2
=
( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ + ‖ zk ‖ )︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸ ( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
∆2
= ∆2
( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
≤ ∆2
( ‖ amax − bminKminzk + dM ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
≤ ∆2
(
amax + bminKmin ‖ zk ‖ + ‖ dM ‖ − ‖ zk ‖
)
∀k = 1, 2, · · ·
∀m = 1, 2, · · · , nd
where ∆2 is positive definite, bmin = min
{ ‖ Bzk1 ‖, ‖ Bzk2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Bzkm ‖ }, Kmin =
min
{ ‖ K1 ‖, ‖ K2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Knd ‖ }.
Since V̂zk is positive definite and ∆V̂Kk is negative definite provided the system state
‖ zk ‖≥ ‖dM ‖+Amax1−bminKmin and Kmin < 1/bmin. Therefore, UUB stability of the regulation error is
proved.
5. SIMULATIONS
In this section, the proposed PTSOC is evaluated and shown to be better than SOC
Xu et al. (2012). Themetrics of regulation performance are overshoot and convergence time
when the delays of network randomly changes. Three scenarios A, B, C are simulated. In
CaseA, the delays satisfy the bound constrainsXu et al. (2012). It illustrates that PTSOCcan
obtain as good performance as that of SOC. Case B illustrates that the system performance
are significantly improved by employing PTSOC, even though the bound changes over time
due to network changes or cyber attacks. In realistic CPSs, topology variation and cyber
attacks bring more dynamics and uncertainties to the embedded network and entire CPS.
63
Therefore, the bounds and constrains of delays made in ideal case are relaxed in Case C.
This illustrates that PTSOC has a better performance in terms of overshoot, convergence
time, and cost of regulation than that of the conventional SOC when the delay bound and
PDF are time-varying.
Simulated benchmark example:
The simulations employ the continuous-time model of a batch reactor system Xu
et al. (2012), Silverman (1986), Hurter et al. (2012) whose dynamic are given by:
Ûx =

1.38 −0.2077 6.715 −5.676
−0.5814 −4.29 0 0.675
1.067 4.273 −6.654 5.893










where x ∈ <4×1 and u ∈ <2×1
The parameters of this CPS are selected as a) the sampling time Ts = 100ms ; b)
d = 2, while the delays are not bounded. The continuous-time model is converted to a
discrete time model with stochastic parameters representing network dynamics.
Case A: Bounded Random Delays with a Fixed PDF
PTSOC is evaluated for an ideal case with delays that satisfy the a priori set
bound constrains of SOC Xu et al. (2012). The delays follow a normal distribution
d∼N(0.15, 0.052). The upper bound is 0.2 sec. Overshoot, convergence time, and cost
of regulation are the primary metrics to evaluate SOC and PTSOC. The tests are repeated
50 times for the statistical validation.
In Figs. 4, 5 and Table 2, the performance of SOC and PTSOC are compared. Both
of these controllers make the errors converge. PTSOC presents an opposite improvement
with high percentages but closed values. This illustrates that SOC is optimal when the
bounds and distribution of delays are satisfied the assumed constraints. Similarly, a longer
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convergence time of PTSOC is induced because the sliding window needs several iterations
to converge the PDF estimation. Importantly, a significantly reduced cost by 92.1% is
conspicuous. It demonstrates that PTSOC tuned by PDF of delays can optimize the trade-
off between regulation error and cost. Overall, SOC and PTSOC have good and comparable
performance when the delays are less than 0.2 sec.
Remark 4: Tuning theQ and R of PTSOCcost function can improve its performance
in terms of overshoot and convergence time at the expense of a higher actuation cost.
However, increasing the cost can lead to inefficient actuation and operating the actuators
beyond its preferred range which leads to excessive wear and damages to actuators and the
system.


























Product Outlet Flow Rate (g/s)
Coolant Oulet Flow Temperature (K)
X : 0.2
Y : 6.05
Figure 4. Case A: Performance evaluation of SOC (tracking errors)
Case B: Increased Random Delays with a Fixed PDF
In this case, the delays increase beyond the initially set bounds of SOC while
maintaining a fixed PDF distribution d∼(0.3, 0.12). Such a case aims to demonstrate
PTSOC still guarantee a good performance with delays with an unknown bound, while SOC
performance degrades in terms of overshoot, convergence time, and the cost of regulation.
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Product Outlet Flow Rate (g/s)
Coolant Oulet Flow Temperature (K)
X: 0.2
Y: 6.106
Figure 5. Case A: Performance evaluation of PTSOC (tracking errors)
The performance of SOC and PTSOC are presented in Figs. 6 and 7. PTSOC
has a significant improved performance when compared with SOC, as shown in Table 3.
Its overshoot is reduced at least by 36.4%. The convergence time is reduced by 7.1%.
Moreover, the cost of regulation is reduced by 94.9% thus the control inputs implemented
by the actuators are within their preferred ranges. Such that the physical components
are prevented from excessive wear and damages. Overall, SOC no longer guarantees the
stability if the delay is over its upper bound. In contrast, PTSOC uses PDF information to
tune the control law such that the performance and stability of the entire CPS is guaranteed.
Remark 5: In this case, the initial conditions are same as that in Case A. The initial
control law of SOC is pre-tuned for the smaller delay bound. Consequently, SOC control
law is selected inappropriately for the case with longer delays. Hence, for the first second,
the system states have large deviations and overshoots as shown in Fig. 6. Over time,
SOC updates the system model and allows it to converge. In contrast, PTSOC can tune its
control laws based on both dynamic model changes and the drift of PDF of delays. Such
that PTSOC quicker adapts to the uncertainties on system model and network delay.
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Product Outlet Flow Rate (g/s)
Coolant Oulet Flow Temperature (K)
X: 0.7
Y: 19 .6
Figure 6. Case B: Performance of SOC (tracking errors)
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Case C: High Variation Delay with Time-varying PDF
Next, the distribution of delays is allowed to change over time. First, it follows a
normal distribution with 0.45sec mean value. Then, the mean value jumps to 0.2sec at
randomly selected timewithin [40s, 50s]. The simulations are repeated to obtain statistically
valid comparisons. The results firmly indicate that tracking of PDF changes is critical in
both system modeling and optimal controller design.
Fig. 8 shows one specific case when the distribution changed at time 47sec. The
parameters Qz = 0.15× I8×8 and Rz = I are set for the SOC. The simulations show that the
controller can make the regulation error converge. However, the errors increase right after
the change in PDF of delays. Additionally, the input command to actuator increases. Such
large inputs often exceed the preferred operating range for actuators thus increasing wear
and tear or saturating actuator response.
In Fig. 9, the performance of PTSOC is presented. PTSOC convergence is sped up
by using the updated PDF information. Hence, a shorter convergence time and a lower cost
of regulation (Table. 4) are observed.
























Product Outlet Flow Rate (g/s)
Coolant Outlet Flow Temperature (K)
X: 50.5
Y: -460.7
Figure 8. Case C: Performance of SOC (tracking errors) for delay change at 47 sec
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Product Outlet Flow Rate (g/s)
Coolant Outlet Flow Temperature (K)
X: 50.5
Y: -47.51
Figure 9. Case C: Performance of PTSOC (tracking errors) for delay change at 47 sec
Overall, SOC makes the error converge with a significant overshoot and a high
actuation cost. Instead, the overshoot and cost of PTSOC are significantly reduced by
several orders of magnitude. Table. 4 shows the average value for 50 simulations. As the
weights of each control input are updated continuously in terms of cost function, PTSOC
has a better performance on overshoot (reduced by 80%) and cost of regulation (reduced
by 96.1%). A cost function with the optimal parameters (Q and R) selection not only
guarantees that Algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) has a finite solution, but also reduces
the control input cost. The convergence time of PTSOC is improved by 17.3%. Overall,
PTSOC significantly improves the system performance in terms of overshoot, convergence
time, and cost for every simulated scenario. Therefore, PTSOC indeed strengthens the
resilience of the entire CPS.
Remark 6: In this case, the delay PDF is kept constant for at least 40 seconds
to allow both PTSOC and SOC to achieve initial convergence. With such “pre-training”
process, the physical systemmodel (1) is accurately tuned. When the change of PDF occurs,
only the network dynamic terms in the model (2) are updated. Thus, both SOC and PTSOC



















































































































































































































































In this work, PTSOC is proposed to address uncertainties of the embedded cy-
berspace, particularly delays with an unknown bound and time-varying distribution. The
simulation results show that PTSOC has a reduced overshoot (by about 80%), convergence
time (by 17.3%), and cost of regulation (by 96%) over that of the SOC. Continuous update
of the probability weights speeds up convergence, optimizes control input selection, and
make control law adapt to delays with unknown bound and time-varying distribution. It
facilitates the trade-off between system states and cost of regulation. Additionally, the
constrains of known bound of delays and fixed distribution in existing works are relaxed.
Overall, reliability of CPSs in terms of resilience are improved.
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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) consists of a network, computation, and physical
process. Embedded networks, which deliver control and sensing signal, can potentially
affect CPSs performance. However, the degradation of physical system performance caused
by the embedded networks is frequently oversimplified with strong assumptions. The
proposed scheme effectively relaxes those assumptions in the existing works, that network
delays are bounded in a specific range or its distribution is time invariant. Most of the existing
works on fault diagnosis and prognosis addressed the physical system fault detection and
isolation, and ignore cyber network faults. A novel cyber network fault prognosis scheme
is proposed to detect and isolate cyber and physical device faults, then forecast the effects
of cyber network faults on the performance of CPSs, and finally trigger resilience controller
at an appropriate time to minimize the computational overhead. Thus, it can guarantee the
stability of the entire CPS and substantially reduce computational overhead of the resilience
control by triggering it if necessary.
Keywords: cyber physical system, fault prognosis, network fault, resilience
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical system (CPS) refers to a new generation of systems with integrated
computation and physical capability that can interact with humans through many new
modalities. As the increasing interdependence between cyber and physical subsystems,
capturing the interrelationship between cyberspace and physical system becomes important
Fisher et al. (2014). The dynamic changes in cyberspace, which are induced by stochastic
channel fading, random traffics, and malicious attacks, affect the physical system states.
Such connectivity is often oversimplified when designing high resilience CPS, resulting
in severe system failures. In this work, we address detecting cyber network faults and
mitigate its negative effects on the physical systems with the proposed resilience controller.
For example, self-driving cars have a large number of radars, cameras, and other various
electrical components (known as electronic control units, or ECUs) connected via an internal
network. If hackers manage to gain access to a vulnerable, peripheral ECU (the Bluetooth
or infotainment system) from there, they may be able to take control of safety critical
ECUs like its brakes or engine and wreak havoc. Falsifying the control commands − for
instance, an acceleration command is replaced by a stop one − definitely threaten users’
lives. Therefore, cyber failures that possibly propagate to physical world has to be detected,
isolated, and mitigated timely to avoid catastrophe failures.
In the past few years, many control and system researchers have pioneered the
development of approaches and tools to model and control CPSs. Liu and Yao (2005) -
Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong (2007) addressed the fault detection, isolation, and mitigation
in the physical subsystem alone (e.g. actuators, sensors, and controlled components). They
assumed the network performs well and satisfies their priori assumptions. Therefore, the
interactions between cyberspace and physical world are ignored or simplified.
At the same time, communication and signal process researchers have made major
breakthroughs in monitoring, identification, and defense of cyber attacks and other security
issues on the cyber side Gamage et al. (2010) - Pasqualetti et al. (2013). Such existing ap-
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proaches focus on either cyber or physical control aspects while ignoring or oversimplifying
the other aspect. However, such decoupling designs will fail in practical CPS. Therefore,
system control and fault prognosis must be redesigned to take full account of the interaction
between cyberspace and physical systems.
Inspired by this motivation, we proposed a novel diagnosis scheme in this work.
The main contributions are listed as following:
a) The proposed diagnosis scheme can timely detect the cyber network fault only based on
the measured delays.
b) A fault isolation scheme is proposed to distinguish cyber network and physical system
faults.
c) A resilience control triggering strategy is investigated to activate the resilience control
ahead of resulting in the degradation on system performance.
The rest paper is organized as following. In Section. 2, the motivation is discussed.
An example is given to illustrate the interdependence between cyberspace and physical
system behavior. Next, the related works on fault diagnosis and prognosis for cyber-
physical systems (CPSs) or networked control systems (NCSs) are presented in Section. 3.
In Section. 4, the proposed prognosis scheme is demonstrated. The simulation results are
shown in Section. 5 and the conclusions are given in Section. 6.
2. MOTIVATION
CPSs are characterized by integrating cyber and physical systems. The performance
of embedded cybers significantly affect CPSs performance and vice versa. However, such
an interaction between physical system behavior and network performance tends to be
oversimplified by researchers. The conventional diagnosis and prognosis methods Liu
and Yao (2005) - Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong (2007) are wildly used in physical system
faults detection and prediction. Similarly, the existing cyber attacks detection and defense
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approaches Gamage et al. (2010) - Pasqualetti et al. (2013) only addressed the security
issues on the cyber/network side without considering the severe consequence of the physical
system.
To address the cyber network fault issues, a full knowledge of the interactions
between cyber dynamics and system performance is crucial for the first step. Next, a
scheme should be proposed for detecting and isolating cyber network and physical system
fault. At last, a resilience controller should be applied before physical system failure.
Because resilience controller consumes a lot of computing capacity and resources, it should
not always be applied when a simple controller can achieve the required physical system
performance. Therefore, the novel diagnosis scheme should accuratelymake the decision for
triggering the resilience control at an appropriate time. Such that unnecessary computational
overhead is effectively reduced.
An example is given to illustrate the relation between cyber uncertainties and system
behavior.
This example simulates a route hijacking by an attacker to eavesdrop control infor-
mation. Such an attack increases delay and delay variation when the attacker secretly relays
and possibly alters the communication between the controller and actuators. A network is
simulated using Network Simulator 2 (NS2) with a random topology of 11 nodes. Ad hoc
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing scheme is adopted. The route through the
topology is altered because the attacker node relays the transmission such that the packet
delays vary for the controller loop, as shown in Fig. 1. Note, that similar network perfor-
mance could be a result of topology or traffic pattern changes. A feedback loop with the
simulated delays employs an optimal controller to regulate a two input four output (2I4O)
system.
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The results show the disturbance in CPS introduced by the network dynamics. With
these delays, a PID controller is simulated for a simple 2I4O (two input four output) system
Xu et al. (2012). Fig. 2 shows that the sudden change of delay at k = 6s makes the system
states vibrate. Consequently, the CPS becomes unstable when the original non-networked
PID controlled performed fine.



















Figure 1. Delays of the simulated network
Figure 2. System performance with a PID controller
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It is concluded that stochastic cyber attacks indeed affect the system performance.
Cyberspace is particularly difficult to secure due to its vulnerabilities of linkages between
cyber and physical systems. Of growing concern is the cyber threat to critical hardware
devices. Cyber attacks could cause harm or disrupt services upon which our economy and
the daily lives depend on. In light of the risk and potential consequences of cyber events,
strengthening the risk awareness and resilience of CPSs has become an important mission.
3. RELATEDWORKS
In this section, we first discuss the existing works on cyber security issues. Next,
the works on fault diagnosis issues of the physical system are discussed.
The overall goals of cyber security include integrity (the trustworthiness of data
or resources), availability (accessibility upon demand), and confidentiality (keeping infor-
mation secret from unauthorized users). Many researchers addressed these issues with
different technologies, such as authentication schemes, access control, and other defense
scheme Gamage et al. (2010) - Pasqualetti et al. (2013). An assumption that the ad-
versary/attack model is fully known is often required; however, it is challenging to get.
Gamage et al. (2010) proposed a general theory of event compensation as an information
flow security enforcement mechanism for CPSs. Message scheduling methods were given
to improve the security quality of wireless networks for mission-critical CPSs in Jiang et al.
(2010). In Amin et al. (2009), deception and denial of service attacks had been addressed
by a countermeasure based on semi-definite programming. False data injection attacks
against static state estimator are studied in Liu et al. (2011). In a similar fashion, stealthy
deception attacks against the Supervisory Control (SC) and Data Acquisition system (DAS),
replay attacks, and covert attacks against control systems were investigated in Teixeira et al.
(2010), Mo and Sinopoli (2009), and Smith (2011) respectively. With respect to the above
works, Pasqualetti et al. (2013) proposed a mathematical framework for CPSs, attacks,
and monitors, and given the fundamental limitations of monitors from system-theoretic
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and graph-theoretic perspectives. Finally, centralized and distributed attack detection and
identification monitors were designed. Overall, many cyber attacks can be addressed on
the cyber side. However, the effects of cyber attacks/faults on the physical system behavior
are oversimplified in the above mentioned existing works. Moreover, the injection time and
model of the attacks/faults are difficult to learn ahead of time in practical CPSs.
The control researchers focused on the conventional fault detection techniques that
have successfully applied to industrial networked control systems (NCSs). They indeed
considered the network delay and packet loss in various ways. In Liu and Yao (2005),
network delays were modeled as a constant delay (time buffer), an independent random
delay, and a delay with known probability distribution governed by the Markov chain
model. In Liu et al. (2007), a networked predictive controller in the presence of random
delay in both forward and feedback channels was proposed to minimized the effects of
network failures. However, they assumed the boundary condition of delays was alway
satisfied. A robust H∞ control for a nonlinear T-S fuzzy model system was proposed to
address the network delays and packet drop in Zhang et al. (2007). Wang et al. (2008)
and Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong (2007) employed a state observer-based fault detection
method on the uncertain long time delay. Although, the network delays and packet drop
caused by network faults/failures were considered in above works, the assumptions, such as
known bounds and time-invariant distribution of delays and packet loss, are always made.
Such assumptions probably result in the entire system failure when the unexpected issues
invalidate the assumptions. In addition, most of the above works aimed to detect the faults of
physical components (sensors, actuators, and system plant), not the faults in the cyberspace.
This work is motivated to address cyber network faults detection and isolation.
Meanwhile, the tolerant control schemes for cyber faults mitigation is designed.
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4. CYBER FAULT DIAGNOSIS SCHEME
In this section, the overview of the proposed cyber fault diagnosis scheme is given
in Section.4.1. The PDF monitoring based observer for cyber fault detection is introduced
in Section.4.2. Then, the isolation of cyber and physical system fault is demonstrated in
Section. 4.3. At last the resilience controller is designed in Section. 4.4.
4.1. Overview
In this work, two observers for cyber and physical system fault detection are designed
respectively. The main idea of cyber fault detection (CFD) is designing a PDF identifier
to capture the distribution variation of network delays. Another observer which supervises
the physical system behavior in a real time manner can capture the physical system fault
by pre-setting the residual for each controlled system state, which is called physical fault
detection (PFD). The frame of the proposed diagnosis scheme is shown in Fig. 3.
The plant we applied in this work is a multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) stochastic
model (2), which includes uncertainties (delays and packet loss) in cyber network. Such a
model can be derived from the conventional discrete time model (1).
The conventional discrete time model was described as following Blundell and
Duncan (1998):













where xk = x(kT) denotes system states; As = eAT , Bk0 =
∫ Ts
dk0
eA(Ts−t)dt, and Bki =∫ dk
i−1−(i−1)Ts
dki −iTs
eA(Ts−t)dt ∀i = 1, 2, ..., d are the system matrices. Ts is sampling interval. A is
the system matrix of the continuous-time model.
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Xu Xu et al. (2012) derived the stochastic model expressed as
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zk = [xTk uTk−1 · · · uTk−d]T is the state variables vector; Azk and Bzk are is the time-varying
system matrices; As and Bki are the system matrices calculated by (1). uk is the control
input; γki and γk−i are binary random variables representing the package reception status (if
the package is received, γ = 1, otherwise, γ = 0). Im is an identity matrix.
Such stochastic model includes the dynamics both of cyber network and physical
systems. Thus, any uncertainties, changes, and faults can be observable by monitoring the
outputs of this model.
4.2. Fault Detection
In this subsection, cyber fault detection are proposed first. Then, a observer-based
physical system fault detection is introduced.
4.2.1. Cyber Fault Detection (CFD). For cyber fault detection, we proposed an
online PDF identifier to capture the variation of delay and its distribution. We assume that
the PDF profile of healthy delays is known as well as the expected value. A residual of the
expected value is user designed.
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Figure 3. Frame of the proposed diagnosis scheme
The proposed fault detection includes three main steps that are continuous repeated:
a) Data collection of delays. n delays ([dk−n+1, · · · , dk]) in the sliding window are
used to do the PDF estimation of time k (PDFk). The probability for each delay interval is
calculated. When the new delay comes in the window at time k + 1, the PDF is updated.
b) PDF estimation. The distribution of these n delays is obtained by using an online
KDE-based PDF identifier. The main steps are shown in Table. 1. Here, a normal kernel
smoother is selected for PDF estimation.
As updating the delays in the sliding window for each sampling interval, the PDF
information is updated for given network situation.
Delays are divided into nd groups based on their values. The probability for each
delay group and the expected value are calculated.
c) Decision making. If the variation of the expected value exceeds the presetted
residual, the cyber network fault is detected.
4.2.2. Physical System Fault Detection (PFD). An standard observer based phys-
ical system fault detection (PFD) Liang and Du (2007) is needed.
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Table 1. Online PDF identification algorithm
1. Determining the data in the sliding window for time k:
a) Choosing a kernel function K centered on x with a bandwidth h;
b) Each observation xi receives a specific weight proportional to the
scaled distance from the observation xi to x, which is
u = (x − xi)/h;
c) At a given x, the estimate is found by vertically summing up over
the k shapes.
This can be synthesized as:
f̂ (x) = 1nh xi ∈ [x − h2, x + h2 ]
The general formula for KDE will be given by
f̂k(x) = 1nh
∑n
i=1 K( x−xih )
where the dependence of the estimate on the kernel function K(.)
is denoted as f̂k .
2. Updating the new data for time k + 1 in the sliding window and go
back to Step 1;
Consider
Ûx = Ax + Bu, y = Cx + Du (3)
where A, B, C, D are system matrices of appropriate dimensions. The faults are often
modelled by extending (3)
Ûx = Ax + Bu + Eww, y = Cx + Du + Fww (4)
where w represents the fault vector and Ew, Fw are known matrices of appropriate dimen-
sions.
By means of a full-order observer described by
Û̂x = Ax̂ + Bu + Lr, r = y − ŷ, ŷ = Cx̂ + Du (5)
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the estimate of system output is provided, which is further used to construct the residual
vector y − ŷ. The observer (5) is also called fault detection filter (FDF) with L being the
gain matrix which makes the FDF stable and residual signal r(t) satisfies
∀u(t), x(0), lim
t→∞ r(t) = 0 (6)
a norm of r(t), typicallyL2− orL∞− norm, is adopted as residual evaluation function, which
is defined by
J = ‖r(t)‖orJ = ‖r(t)‖∞ (7)
Let Jth = supx0,w=0J be the threshold, which is interpreted as themaximum influence
of x(0) = x0 on the fault-free (w(t) = 0) residual vector r(t). A simple form of detection
logic is 
J > Jth f aulty
J ≤ Jth f ault − f ree
(8)
4.3. Fault Isolation
When designing the proposed fault diagnosis scheme, CFD and PFD supervise
the states of cyberspace and physical systems in real-time. Thus, the root-cause of the
abnormality happening in cyber-physical system can be timely captured and accurately
isolated. The primary isolation logic is illustrated in Fig. 4.
For the fault isolation, three residuals have to be monitored in an online manner:
Expected Value Residual (EVR): It is the difference of the expected value of delays
at k and the last interval k−1 (EVR(k) = EV(k)−EV(k−1)). Such information is provided
by the proposed PDF identifier. The corresponding threshold TEVR is customizable by the
users for satisfying the requirement of fault awareness capability. If EVR(k) > TEVR, the
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Figure 4. Fault isolation logic
Modeled system output residual (MSOR): It is provided by the PFD observer, which
is the difference of outputs of modeled and that of actual systems: MSOR = x(k) − x̂(k).
The corresponding thresholdTMSOR is selected to detect physical system faults. IfMSOR >
TMSOR, the physical system fault is detected.
System performance residual (SPR): It is the difference between actual and desired
system outputs: SPR = xd(k) − x(k). The threshold for each system output variable TSPR
is determined by the saturation of physical components. This residual is used to evaluate
the system performance and determine when the system should shut down.
Also, the resilience scheme for two types of fault are different and proposed in next
subsection.
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4.4. Fault Tolerant Control
In this section, we proposed a resilience controller for cyber network fault mitigation.
The triggering strategy is also given. The Lyapunove-based stability analysis is used to prove
the convergence of the proposed controller. In addition, we briefly introduce the physical
system fault tolerant control.
4.4.1. TheResilienceControl forCyberFaults. APDF-based tuning of stochastic
optimal controller (PTSOC) is designed to mitigate the adverse effects induced by the
uncertainties of cyberspace and adapt to the random occurrence of cyber faults. Its control
law considers the PDF of delays by optimizing a weighted summation of cost functions of
different delay ranges (9). Each weight is the probability of its corresponding delay intervals











Pi(xkTi Qzixki + ukTi Rziuki )
]
(9)
where i presents the delay interval (dinti < dk < dint(i + 1)); n is the total number of delay
cases; k represents sampling interval; Pi is probability of delay within dinti to dint(i + 1)
provided by the PDF identifier; xi is the states vector; ui is the control inputs vector;
Qzi = diag[Qi, Rid , ...] and Rzi = Rid are symmetric positive semi-definite and symmetric
positive definite respectively. E[•] is the expectation operator.
By optimizing (9), the control input is given by:








where K(k) is the optimal gain and u(k) is the control input; Szi(k) ≥ 0 is the solution of the
algebraic riccati equation (ARE) equation; nd = dupper/dint , dupper is the maximum delay
in the sliding window; Pi(k) is the probability of dinti < d(k) < dint(i + 1).
Remark 1: TheQi and Ri in the cost function for each delay range should be different
because each pair of Qi and Ri should be the optimal values for the delays bounded in a
specific range. They cannot guarantee a high level with the delays out of such boundaries.
The stability analysis is presented in Appendix A.0.1.
4.4.2. The Tolerant Control for Physical System Faults. Many existing works
have addressed fault tolerant control design. Here, we adopt a traditional fault tolerant
control (FTC) proposed in Yang et al. (2009).
5. SIMULATIONS
In this section, the proposed diagnosis scheme is evaluated by simulations in MAT-
LAB. The resilience controller in Section. 4.4.1 is applied. A conventional stochastic
optimal control Xu et al. (2012) is employed as a reference.
A continuous-time batch reactor system is taken as a case study. Its dynamics are
given by Xu et al. (2012).
Ûx =

1.38 −0.2077 6.715 −5.676
−0.5814 −4.29 0 0.675
1.067 4.273 −6.654 5.893










The parameters of this CPS are selected as:
a) The sampling time is 100ms;
b) The considered delays in the system model is less than 2 sampling interval, d = 2;
c) dint = 0.1s;
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Figure 5. The simulated delays
The delays before 47s follows a normal distribution (0.5, 0.052). The data number
M in the sliding window is 30. By using kernel density estimation (KDE) to analyze these
delays, a PDF profile for the “healthy” operating condition is obtained. Meanwhile, the
threshold for fault detection is 0.1s. Therefore, the expectation which exceeds the threshold
is considered as a cyber fault.
The fault launched at t = 47s leads to a series of abnormal delays shown in Fig.
5. The expectation gets across the threshold at 47.9s. The cyber network fault is detected.
Simultaneously, there is no unusual behavior detected by the observer (Fig. 7). Therefore,
the fault only happens on the cyberspace side, not physical components side. At 47.9s, the
resilience control is triggered to mitigate the fault.
If the cyber network fault is not detected in time and no action is taken for fault
mitigation, all of the system outputs overflow out of the physical limitation, even worse, the
physical component might get unrepairable damages. In Fig. 8, visibly, the cyber fault can
be captured in time and the degradations are reduced to at least 55%. The improvements
can be found in Table. 2.
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Figure 6. Expectation variation
Figure 7. Modeled system output residual
Table 2. The comparison of overshoot and TTR
Variables Overshoot TTRSOC PTSOC Improvement SOC PTSOC Improvement
Fluid level 423.2cm 64.88cm 84.7% 9.4s 7.3s 22.3%
Inside temperature 58.54K 29.55K 49.5% 7.7s 5.6s 27.3%
Product outlet flow rate 457g/s 72.67g/s 84.1% 7.6s 4.5s 40.8%
Coolant outlet temperature 82.9K 45.56K 45% 8.7s 6.3s 27.6%
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Figure 8. Fault mitigation performance
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6. CONCLUSIONS
A novel diagnosis scheme is shown to quickly detect and isolate cyber network
faults using PDF monitoring and estimation. With the proposed resilience controller, the
adverse effects caused by cyber network faults are effectively mitigated. The stability for
the proposed controller is proved using Lyapunov-based analysis.
The simulation results show that the proposed scheme accurately detect the cyber
network faults. Moreover, the PTSOC is timely triggered to mitigate the negative effects on
the CPSs performance. The overshoot is significantly reduced by at least 45% and TTR is
shorten by 22% than that of the SOC because the continuously updating probability weights
optimize the parameters of control law.
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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) consists of a network, computation, and physical
process. Embedded networks, which deliver control and sensing signal, can potentially
affect CPSs performance. However, the degradation of physical system performance caused
by the embedded networks is frequently oversimplified with strong assumptions. The
proposed scheme effectively relaxes those assumptions in the existing works, that network
delays are bounded in a specific range or its distribution is time invariant. Most of the existing
works on fault diagnosis and prognosis addressed the physical system fault detection and
isolation, and ignore cyber network faults. A novel cyber network fault prognosis scheme
is proposed to detect and isolate cyber and physical device faults, then forecast the effects
of cyber network faults on the performance of CPSs, and finally trigger resilience controller
at an appropriate time to minimize the computational overhead. Thus, it can guarantee the
stability of the entire CPS and substantially reduce computational overhead of the resilience
control by triggering it if necessary.
Keywords: cyber physical system, fault prognosis, network fault, resilience
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical systems (CPSs) refer to systems with integrated computational net-
work and physical components. With the increasing connectivity among the cyberspace
and physical systems, capturing the interactions between the cyber and the physical systems
becomes increasingly important Fisher et al. (2014). In particularly, network imperfections
and dynamics - such as limited channel capacity, traffic congestions, and malicious attacks
- can degrade the performance or even destabilize the control system. This makes con-
troller design more challenging and complex. In the existing literature, this issue is often
oversimplified when designing CPS controllers, and could result in severe system failure.
For example, hackers can remotely take control of a vehicle and cut its transmission on
the highway Yağdereli et al. (2015). The threat of automotive cyber attacks also threatens
people’s life. Therefore, detection, estimation, isolation, and mitigation scheme of cyber
attacks/faults has to be investigated to improve the resilience of the entire CPSs.
In the past few years, many control and system researchers have pioneered the
development of approaches and tools to model and control CPSs. Some of them Liu and
Yao (2005) - Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong (2007) addressed the fault detection, isolation,
and mitigation in the physical subsystem alone (e.g. actuators, sensors, and controlled
components). At the same time, communication and signal process researchers have made
major breakthroughs in monitoring, identification, and defense of cyber attacks and other
security issues on the cyber side Rawat et al. (2015) - Pasqualetti et al. (2013). Such
existing approaches focus on either cyber or physical control aspects while ignoring or
oversimplifying the other aspect. However, such decoupled designs will often fail in
practical CPS. Therefore, system control and fault prognosis must be redesigned to take full
account of the interaction between cyberspace and physical systems.
Inspired by this motivation, we proposed a novel prognosis scheme in this work.
The main contributions are:
a) Proposed a novel prognosis scheme for cyber network fault detection and prediction.
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b) Derived the estimation of network delay distribution based on time series analysis. The
convergence of the estimation error is presented in Lemma 1.
c) Proposed an isolation scheme to distinguish soft and hard faults based on the prediction
of potential failures on system states. Theorem 1 shows the convergence of such prediction.
d) Developed a decision making scheme for resilience control triggering. The simulation
results in Section. 5 illustrate that this scheme proactively trigger the resilience control and
effectively avoid physical system failure.
The rest paper is organized as following. In Section. 1.1, a motivation example is
given to illustrate the relationship of cyber condition and system behavior. Next, the related
works on fault diagnosis and prognosis are presented in Section. 2. In Section. 3, the
proposed prognosis scheme is demonstrated. The simulation results are shown in Section.
5 and the conclusions are given in Section. 6.
1.1. Motivation Example
In this section, the design challenge caused by interacting cyber network and physical
system is discussed in a simple scenario. It illustrates the need to consider the interaction
between physical components and network in resilient CPSs.
This example emulates a route hijacking by an attacker to eavesdrop control infor-
mation that could later be used to take over the controller. Such an attack increases delay
and delay variation when the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communication
between the controller and actuators. A network is simulated using Network Simulator 2
(NS2) with a random topology of 11 nodes. Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing scheme is adopted. The route through the topology is altered because the attacker
node relays the transmission such that the packet delays vary for the controller loop, as
shown in Fig. 1. (a). Note, that similar network performance could be a result of topology
or traffic pattern changes. A feedback loop with the simulated delays employs an optimal
controller to regulate a two input four output (2I4O) system Xu et al. (2012).
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Figure 1. a) Delays
b) Tracking errors of optimal controller
The results show the disturbance in CPS induced by the network dynamics. Fig.
1. (b) shows the optimal controller make the system states converge before 10.5s. Then,
a route hijacking attack is launched. The sudden changes of delay at t = 10.5s make the
system states oscillating. Consequently, the CPS becomes unstable due to such network
dynamics.
It is concluded that stochastic cyber attacks indeed affect the system performance.
Cyberspace is particularly difficult to secure due to its vulnerabilities of linkages between
cyber and physical systems. Of growing concern is the cyber threat to critical hardware
devices. Cyber network faults could cause harmor disrupt services uponwhich our economy
and the daily lives depend on. In light of the risk and potential consequences of cyber events,
strengthening the risk awareness and resilience of CPSs has become an important mission.
To address the cyber network fault issues on the physical system side, a full knowl-
edge of the relation between cyber condition and system performance is essential. Hence,
we propose a scheme for detecting and isolating cyber and physical system faults. Also,
a resilience control triggering strategy is added to proactively trigger the controller and
accommodate the potential failures ahead of time.
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2. RELATEDWORKS
In this section, we first briefly discuss the existing works on cyber security. Next,
the works on fault awareness of the physical system are discussed.
The overall goals of cyber security include integrity (the trustworthiness of data
or resources), availability (accessibility upon demand), and confidentiality (keeping infor-
mation secret from unauthorized users). Many researchers addressed these issues with
different technologies, such as authentication schemes, access control, and other defense
scheme Pasqualetti et al. (2013) - Cardenas et al. (2008). An assumption that the adver-
sary/attack model is fully known is often required; however, it is challenging to obtain.
In Amin et al. (2009) deception and denial of service attacks against a networked control
system are addressed. They proposed a countermeasure based on semi-definite program-
ming. This work and the following literature are only valid for a specific attack model which
cannot be known in priori. A defense scheme without requiring the knowledge about the
attack model is needed.
In Liu et al. (2011), false data injection attacks against static state estimators are
introduced. Undetectable false data injection attacks can be designed even when the attacker
has limited resources. Also, stealthy deception attacks against the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition system are studied in Teixeira et al. (2010). Mo and Sinopoli (2009)
studied the effect of replay attacks on a control system. In Smith (2011), the effect of covert
attacks against control systems is investigated. A parameterized decoupling structure alter
the behavior of the physical plant while remaining undetected from the original controller.
Gamage et al. (2010) proposed a general theory of event compensation as an information
flow security enforcement mechanism for CPSs. Message scheduling methods were given
to improve the security quality of wireless networks for mission-critical CPSs in Jiang et al.
(2010).
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With respect to the above works, Pasqualetti et al. (2013) proposed a mathematical
framework for CPSs, attacks, and monitors, and given the fundamental limitations of
monitors from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives. Finally, centralized and
distributed attack detection and identification monitors were designed. Overall, many cyber
attacks can be addressed on the cyber side. However, the effects of cyber attacks/faults
on the physical system behavior are oversimplified in the above mentioned existing works.
Moreover, the injection time and model of the attacks/faults are difficult to learn ahead of
time in practical CPSs.
The control researchers focused on the conventional fault detection techniques that
have successfully applied to industrial networked control systems (NCSs). They indeed
considered the network delay and packet loss in various ways. In Zhu and Martinez (2011),
a resilient control problem is studied, in which control packets transmitted over a network
are corrupted by a human adversary. They proposed a receding-horizon Stackelberg control
law to stabilize the control system despite the attack. However, the proposed approach
required a priori knowledge on attack model and type. In Liu and Yao (2005), network
delays were modeled as a constant delay (time buffer), an independent random delay, and
a delay with known probability distribution governed by the Markov chain model. In Liu
et al. (2007), a networked predictive controller in the presence of random delay in both
forward and feedback channels was proposed to minimized the effects of network failures.
A robust H∞ control for a nonlinear T-S fuzzy model system was proposed to address the
network delays and packet drop in Zhang et al. (2007). However, they assumed the upper
bound of delays is known. This is challenging to be satisfied in reality. Wang et al. (2008)
and Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong (2007) employed a state observer-based fault detection
method on the uncertain long time delay. Although, the network delays and packet drop
caused by network faults/failures were considered in above works, the assumptions, such as
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known bounds and time-invariant distribution of delays and packet loss, are always made.
In addition, most of the above works aimed to detect the faults of physical components
(sensors, actuators, and system plant), not the faults in the cyberspace.
This work is motivated to address cyber network faults detection, isolation, and
prediction. Meanwhile, the tolerant control scheme and it triggering strategy are proposed
to stabilize the CPS despite cyber network faults and optimize the computational overhead.
3. THE PROPOSED PROGNOSIS SCHEME
In this section, the overview of the proposed prognosis scheme is given in Section.
3.1. An online kernel density estimation (KDE) based probability density function (PDF)
identifier is introduced in Section. 3.2. Then, the details of the proposed prognosis scheme
are presented in Section. 4. At last, the resilience controller is designed in Section. 4.3.
3.1. Overview
In this work, the uncertainties in the cyberspace, including traffic congestions,
topology changes, and attacks, are causing abnormal delays and packet losses on the physical
system side. Monitoring such delays and packet losses online is required for detection of
cyber network faults. Moreover, an observer is needed to detect physical system faults and
isolate them from cyber network faults Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong (2007).
The proposed prognosis scheme is shown in Fig. 2. It includes four main steps that
are continuously repeated:
a) Data collection of network delays. n delays ([dk−n+1, · · · , dk]) in the sliding
window are used to do the PDF estimation at time k (PDFk). When the new delay is
measured, the data in the sliding window is updated.
b) Cyber Network Fault Detection. The PDF of these n delays is obtained by
using the online KDE-based PDF identifier. The probability for each delay interval Pki is
calculated. Compare Pki to P
k−1
i to compute the variation of probabilities ∆P
k




Figure 2. Flow chart of cyber network fault prognosis scheme
exceeds the set threshold Rpi , the PDF variation is captured and a cyber network fault is
detected. Meanwhile, if there is no abnormal behavior presented in the observer, it can be
confirmed that only cyber network fault happens.
c) Potential degradation prediction. If a cyber network fault is detected, the PDF of
new delay distribution is predicted by using time series analysis. Then, the delays following
the new distribution are resampled. Finally, the prediction of the future physical system
outputs is obtained. If the system states deviate out of the acceptable range, the hard fault
is detected. Otherwise, it is a soft fault which is not severe enough to trigger the resilience
controller. More details about fault isolation are presented in Section. 4.
d) Resilience controller triggering. If a hard fault is detected, the resilience controller
is triggered and its parameters are tuned online by the probabilities of delays computed in
b).
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Such a scheme can detect stochastic cyber failures/attacks without requiring the
knowledge of attack model and its injection time a priori. Only monitoring the PDF of
delays in real-time is required to do PDF and system states prediction. Moreover, the
resilience control law tuned by the probabilities of delays is derived accurately for the given
cyber performance. Its details are introduced in Section. 4.
3.2. PDF Identifier
To obtain the probability information mentioned in Step (b), a PDF identifier is
employed Bi and Zawodniok (2017). It uses kernel density estimation (KDE) to estimate
the distribution of delays iteratively. The data used to make the identification is updated
every sampling interval for a window of n last packet delays. The main steps of online PDF
identification are shown in Appendix. (B.0.1). Here, a normal kernel smoother is selected
for PDF estimation.
Such a sliding window based PDF identifier provides the PDF profile of delays in
real-time such that the variation of PDF can be captured and observed easily.
4. CYBER NETWORK FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
Cyber network fault is detected by monitoring probability residual (PR). The other
residuals - modeled system output residual and system performance residual - are used to
isolate cyber network and physical components fault. Then, the prediction of the future
new delay distribution and system state prediction are used to isolate soft and hard cyber
network fault. Finally, the decision of resilience control triggering is made.
4.1. Cyber Network Fault Detection
For cyber network fault detection, three residuals have to be monitored in an online
manner:
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a) Probability Residual (PR): It is the difference of the probability at k and the last
interval k − 1. Such information is provided by the proposed PDF identifier. The PR at
time k for each delay interval is denoted as ∆Pki = P
k
i − Pk−1i . The corresponding threshold
Rpi is customizable by the users for satisfying the requirement of fault awareness capability.
If ∆Pki > Rpi , the cyber network fault is detected.
b) Modeled system output residual (MSOR): It is provided by the observer, which is
the difference of outputs of modeled and that of actual systems: MSOR = x(k) − x̂(k). The
corresponding threshold RMSOR is selected to detect physical system faults. If MSOR >
RMSOR, the physical system fault is detected.
c) System performance residual (SPR): It is the difference between actual and
desired system outputs: SPR = xd(k)− x(k). The threshold for each system output variable
RSPR is determined by the acceptable error magnitudes of system states. This residual is
used to evaluate the system performance and determine when the system should shut down.
If PR exceeds its threshold, a cyber network fault is detected. Meanwhile, MSOR
and SPR should be supervised to do the root-cause analysis of the degradation of system
performance. If a cyber network fault is detected, the type of this fault (soft or hard fault)
should be learned before triggering the resilience controller. That is because not all types of
cyber network fault need to bemitigated by the resilience controller. Unnecessary triggering
will result in additional computational resource wasting. When soft faults happen, the
adverse effects on system performance can be handled by the existing controller. Therefore,
there is no need to take other control actions. Typically, an alarm or warning is sufficient. On
the contrary, hard faults potentially threaten the system performance in terms of overshoot,
time-to-recover (TTR), and cost of regulation, even stability. Moreover, wear and tear or
severe damages of the system components might be induced by such faults. Hence, timely
detecting hard faults and triggering the resilience controller are vital for guaranteeing
system stability. Moreover, with isolating of soft and hard faults, inefficient triggering of
the resilience controller is avoided and the overall computational cost is reduced.
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4.2. Soft and Hard Cyber Network Fault Isolation
To recognize hard cyber network fault, we proposed an approach to trend the delay
distribution into the future. Next, a system state prediction scheme evaluates system
performance for the estimated future delay distribution. In most cases, there is no need
to perform the computation expensive prediction. Hence, it is triggered based on a user-
defined threshold. As shown in Fig. 2, Rpi is a user-defined threshold for each probability
variation Pi(t). If Pi(t) > Rpi is true and the new delay Delay(t) follows the distribution of
time t−1, there is no cyber network fault. The distribution and system states predictors will
not be activated. Otherwise, a delay distribution change will be observed in PDF identifier
and the predictors are activated.
The predictions include four main steps that are repeated until the resilience con-
troller is triggered:
Step 1: new distribution estimation;
Step 2: resampling;
Step 3: system output prediction;
Step 4: soft and hard fault isolation and resilience control triggering.
These steps are discussed in details next.
4.2.1. Step 1: New Distribution Estimation. The expectation and standard de-
viation of the new distribution are estimated based on the delays which induce a new
distribution.
Time series analysis is utilized to estimate the autoregressive (AR) model for the
expectation E and standard deviation D of the new distribution. The hypothesis of the


















Ê(k + 1|k) is the forecast of E(k + 1|k) and D(k + 1|k) based on E(k) and D(k),




























The one-period ahead forecast error is:












The forecast errors converge by minimizing the following objective index:
J =





αeE (k + 1)
βeD(k + 1)
 (4)
where α and β, which can be customized by users, are the weights for the estimate errors
of E and D respectively. Such parameters balance the trade-off between the degree of
optimization of two errors. For our case, we take α = β = 1 meaning these two errors are
minimized to the same degree.
Such that the update law of θ̂(k), L(k), and O(k) can be obtained.
θ̂(k) = θ̂(k − 1) + L(k)e(k)
L(k) = O(k − 1)ϕ(k)
ϕ(k)TO(k − 1)ϕ(k)
O(k) = (I − L(k)ϕ(k)T )O(k − 1)
(5)
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where L(k) and O(k) denote estimator gain and estimation of error variance, respectively.
Their initial values are randomly set.
Remark 1: The parameters θ̂(k), L(k), and O(k) are continuously updated by the
training data in the sliding window at time K . We assume that the distribution of time k + 1
does not change so that the one step prediction for time k + 1 is valid to predict the system
behavior.
Lemma 1: With the update law (5) and more new delays loaded in the sliding
window, the objective index (4) is continuously minimized. Then the following statements
are true:
a) the estimation errors of the expected value and standard deviation of new delays
converge.
b)
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 holds.
The proof can be found in Qin (1998) and Simon (2006).
Remark 2: Even if the network condition is perfect, unexpected delays, which
are out of the healthy range, occasionally occurs in a long period. That can lead to the
inefficient triggering of resilience control. Using the above time series analysis, not only
the distribution change can be tracked in real-time, but also the trend of distribution change
is identified and predicted. Such that the occasional event can be filtered without resilience
control triggering.
4.2.2. Step 2: Resampling. Based on the future delay distribution provided by
step 1, a series of random delays is generated, which follows the new distribution.
4.2.3. Step 3: System Output Prediction. The resampled delays are fed to the
system model which takes into account dynamic delays and packet losses. Such a time-
varying system is given by:




x(k)T u(k − 1)T ... u(k − d)T
]T
is the state variables vector; uk is the
control input; Az(k) and Bz(k) are the system dynamic matrices and given by
Az(k) =

A γ(k − 1)B1(k) ... γ(k − i)Bi(k) ... γ(k − d)Bd(k)
0 0 ... ... ... 0
0 Im ... ... 0 0















In×n if the control input is received at time k
0n×n if the control input is lost at time k
Finally, the possible system behavior induced by the new distribution of delays are
estimated and denoted as ẑk .
Prediction Convergence Analysis: The prediction error z˜k convergence is demon-
strated in Theorem 1. The dynamic matrices Az j and Bz j for each delay interval are
deterministic and their calculation can be found in Xu et al. (2012).
Theorem 1 (Error of system states prediction convergence): As the delay data keeps
updating PDF identifier and
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 is satisfied, then the
prediction error for system output ‖ z˜(k) ‖ asymptotically converges to zero.
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Proof: The prediction error is given by
z˜k = zk − ẑk
= (Az(k) − Bz(k)K(k))z(k) − (Âz(k) − B̂z(k)K(k))z(k)
= (Az(k) − Âz(k))z(k) − (Bz(k) − B̂z(k))K(k)z(k)
= (A˜z(k) − B˜z(k)K(k))z(k)
Therefore, the convergence of z˜i can be proven by proving the convergence of A˜z(k) and
B˜z(k)
We define the prediction error of Az(k) as A˜z(k) = Az(k) − Âz(k). Az(k) can
be expressed as
∑n
j=1 Pj(k)Az j Pj(k) is the actual probability at k. Similarly, we denoteAz(k) = ∑nj=1 P̂j(k)Az j . P̂j(k) is the estimate probability provided by the PDF profile. The
estimation error of the probability is P˜j(k) = Pj(k) − P̂j(k). Then, Lyapunov function
candidate is VAz(k) = A˜z(k)T A˜z(k).
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Pj(k + 1)Az j −
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) ‖ Az j ‖2
∆1 > 0
Since VAz(k) is positive definite and ∆VAz(k) is negative definite provided
( ‖∑n




< 0 (Lemma 1). Therefore, the prediction error
of Az(k) asymptotically converge to zero. Similarly, the prediction error of Bz(k) can be
proven with the same procedure. Such that z˜(k) asymptotically converge to zero.
Remark 3: Themaximum error occurs when the first sample of the new distribution
comes in the sliding window. Then, the accuracy of PDF estimation improves as the sliding
window includes more and more new samples from the new distribution after the PDF
change occurs. Therefore,
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 holds.
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4.2.4. Step 4: Soft and Hard Fault Isolation and Resilience Control Triggering
Strategy. The acceptable error magnitude of state i is defined as Rẑi . If ẑi > Rẑi , this fault
is marked as a hard cyber network fault. A warning is triggered as well as the resilience
controller. Otherwise, this is a soft fault that can be handled with the original controller
operating normally.
In summary, the proposed prognosis scheme can timely detect cyber network faults
and isolate soft and hard faults because the dynamics of the network is continuously
monitored. Accurately isolating soft and hard fault optimize the decision of resilience
controller triggering as well as the computational resources allocation. When hard faults
occur, the resilience controller can be timely triggered before adverse effects on system
performance happening.
4.3. Resilience Control Strategy
In this section, the employed resilience controller is presented for completeness.
PDF-based tuning of stochastic optimal controller (PTSOC) Bi and Zawodniok (2017)
mitigates the adverse effects induced by the uncertainties of cyberspace and adapt to the
random occurrence of cyber network faults.
Remark 4: PTSOC has a good adaptability to a time-varying distribution of delays,
but lead to more computation overhead than the traditional resilience controller. There-
fore, the above strategy Section. 4.2.4 aims to determine an appropriate time to trigger
the resilience controller without consuming the computational overhead. Meanwhile, the
proposed strategy based on fault isolation proactively trigger the controller, rather than
triggering it when a failure or damage has occurred. Such that, the system performance and
stability are guaranteed.
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The PTSOC control law considers the PDF of delays by optimizing a weighted
summation of cost functions of different delay ranges (7). Each weight is the probability of











Pi(xkTi Qzixki + ukTi Rziuki )
]
(7)
where i presents the delay interval (dinti < dk < dint(i + 1)); n is the total number of delay
cases; k represents sampling interval; Pi is probability of delay within dinti to dint(i + 1)
provided by the PDF identifier; xi is the states vector; ui is the control inputs vector;
Qzi = diag[Qi, Rid , ...] and Rzi = Rid are symmetric positive semi-definite and symmetric
positive definite respectively. E[•] is the expectation operator.
By optimizing (7), the control input is given by:







where K(k) is the optimal gain and u(k) is the control input; Szi(k) ≥ 0 is the solution of the
algebraic riccati equation (ARE) equation; nd = dupper/dint , dupper is the maximum delay
in the sliding window; Pi(k) is the probability of dinti < d(k) < dint(i + 1).
Remark 5: TheQi and Ri in the cost function for each delay range should be different
because each pair of Qi and Ri should be the optimal values for the delays bounded in a
specific range. They cannot guarantee a high level with the delays out of such boundaries.
Stability Analysis Bi and Zawodniok (2017):
Two theorems and their corresponding proofs are presented to demonstrate the
stability of the proposed PTSOC. Lyapunov-based stability analysis is used. Theorem
2 (Appendix (B.0.2)) shows the control gain estimation asymptotically converges even
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if PDF estimation has an error provided it asymptotically converges to zero. Theorem
3 (Appendix (B.0.3)) considers the irremovable bias of PDF estimation as a bounded
disturbance. However, a UUB stability is guaranteed. The proofs for these theorems can be
found in Bi and Zawodniok (2017).
5. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the proposed prognosis scheme is evaluated by simulations in MAT-
LAB. Section. 5.1 demonstrates the convergence of the system state prediction. In this
case, the resilience controller triggering is disabled to observe the prediction performance
alone. Then, both soft and hard cyber network fault scenarios are presented separately to
demonstrate the cyber network fault detection and isolation performance in Sections. 5.2
and 5.3. The resilience controller in Section. 4.3 is applied. A conventional stochastic
optimal control Xu et al. (2012) is employed as a reference.
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The parameters of this CPS are selected as:
a) The sampling time is 100ms;
b) The considered delays in the system model is less than 2 sampling interval, d = 2;
c) dint = 0.1s;
d) The threshold of the probability variation Rpi is 0.03s, unless otherwise states;
e) The sliding window size M is 30.
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Estimated states at t=47.1s
Estimated states at t=47.3s
Estimated states at t=47.5s
Figure 3. Case A: Actual and predicted system behavior
5.1. System State Prediction Evaluation
This scenario demonstrates that the accuracy of the system state prediction improves
as more new delay measurements update the distribution estimation.
Here, the PTSOC triggering is disabled to allow continuous, uninterrupted predic-
tions of system states. The fault is injected at 47s. Fig. 3 shows that the prediction at 47.1s
significantly diverges from the actual system behavior. As more new delays are loaded in
the sliding window, the PDF estimation of the new distribution improves. Such that the
predicted system states become more accurate. The predictions at 47.5s is more accurate
than that at 47.1s. Other results are shown in Appendix (B.0.4).
5.2. Soft Cyber Network Fault
In this scenario, a network congestion fault is simulated, which occurs when a
network node is relaying more data than it can handle. It usually causes a gradual increase
of delays. Rpi and M are user-defined parameters. These simulations are repeated 50
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times for the statistical validation. With 50 repeated simulations for different soft faults,
the proposed scheme only needs 0.42s in average to detect the fault. With Rpi = 0.03s,
the faults are 100% detected. The results in Figs. 4 are only for one case to illustrate the
performance of the proposed prognosis scheme.
Before the first 50s, the delays follow a normal distribution N(0.3, 0.052). Then, a
network congestion attack (e.g. denial-of-service) is launched at 50s and the delays after
50s follow a new normal distribution N(0.5, 0.12). Fig. 4 presents the result for fluid level.
As shown in Fig. 4 (a), the probability variation exceeds the threshold at 50.2s. A cyber
network fault is detected. Simultaneously, the awareness of the cyber network fault triggers
the system state prediction shown in Fig. 4 (b) and Appendix (B.0.4). The oscillation are
observed, but are small enough for the basic controller to handle. Therefore, this fault is a
soft fault. The resilience controller does not have to be triggered.
The traditional diagnosis scheme Xu et al. (2012) usually preset an threshold, which
is a constant, for the network delay to capture the delay variation. When the delay exceeds
the bound, the resilience controller will be activated. Such that some unnecessary triggering
might occur resulting in increased computational overhead and false reactions of resilience
controller. According to Fig. 4 (a), the resilience controller should be activated 12 times
if the traditional fault diagnosis is applied. However, applying the resilience control is not
necessary and induce more resource waste and wear and tear of system hardware. On the
contrary, such negative consequence can be avoided with applying our proposed scheme.
Remark 6: There are several cyber network fault detection before 50s because Rpi
for this scenario is selected at low level. Hence, false detection occur. However, they would
only cause more computational overhead and have no input on system stability. Overall,
this trade-off should be considered when selecting Rpi.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4. Case B: a) Selected probability variation
b) Predicted and actual system output
Table 1. The crossing points
Variables Estimated point Actual point Estimation Error
Fluid level 48.4s 48.7s 0.6%
Inside temperature 48.4s 48.6s 0.4%
Product outlet flow rate 48.2s 48.2s 0%
Coolant outlet temperature 48.2s 48.3s 0.2%
Remark 7: After the first soft fault detection, the proposed scheme should con-
tinuously supervise the cyber condition. That is because a soft fault possibly becomes a
hard fault in the near future. Also, a warning should be issued to human supervisor to take
additional precautions (e.g. investigate attack or update firewall)
5.3. Hard Cyber Network Fault
In this scenario, a man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) is simulated. The attacker
secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between two parties who believe
they are directly communicating with each other. The transmitted information, such as
control commands and feedback measurements, can be eavesdropped and delayed. Here,

























































































































































































































MitM attacks intermittently. As the results, the distribution of delays is varied over time
(Fig. 5.(a)). The acceptable error magnitudes are set for four system states: 400cm for the
fluid level; 50k for the inside temperature; 40g/s for the product outlet flow rate; and 50k
for the coolant outlet temperature.
As Fig. 5. (b) showing, the sudden change of delay at 47s is detected at 47.1s
because the probability of delays within [0.2, 0.3] suddenly decreases. In Fig. 6. (a) and
Appendix (B.0.4), all the predicted system outputs exceed their acceptable range. The
estimated and actual points that the system states pass through the acceptable error are
shown in Table. 1. This prediction can achieve at least 99.6% accuracy. It is concluded that
this fault is a hard cyber network fault and its adverse effects on the system performance is
predicted. The resilience control is triggered at 47.1s to mitigate such effects. Comparing
with the original SOC, the overshoots are reduced by at least 89.6%, the TTRs are shortened
by 31.2%. The summary of improvements can be found in Table. 2.
When applying the proposed scheme, the fault is quickly detected and the resilience
controller is timely triggered ahead of the serious degradation of system performance. Also,
the overshoot of each system output is significantly reduced in term of its corresponding
TTR. In contrast, without applying the proposed scheme, the fault still can be detected
when the system states exceed the acceptable error magnitude at 48.5s. The fault tolerant
controller, which is a tuned PID controller, is triggered. However, it is too late to recover
the system performance with such a late activation of the resilience controller. In such case,
the basic controller will try to apply excessive actuation (Table. 2) to stabilize. This might
lead to significantly damage of the components or cause an unscheduled downtime. Even
worse, the system could be compelled to stop. The above simulation is repeated for 50
times. All the faults are accurately detected.
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Figure 5. Case C: a) The simulated delays
b) Selected probability variation










































































Figure 6. Case C: a) Predicted and actual system output
b) Fault mitigation performance
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5.4. Discussion
We conducted 100 simulations with 50 soft and 50 hard fault cases and, to evaluate
the isolation accuracy of the proposed scheme. All of the faults are detected. However, 58
hard faults are identified, that is 8 soft faults are incorrectly recognized as hard faults. The
threshold for fault isolation is set ensure 100% correct isolation of hard faults. Those false
hard fault identification have no negative impact on system stability and performance, only
increase the computational overhead.
It is important to note that the traditional physical system fault detection, which
is a model-based observer, cannot detect any abnormalities in cyberspace. The network
dynamics concurrently change themathematical model of the physical system and themodel
used for observer design. Such that the outputs from the observer and physical system are
same. Therefore, the model-based observer can only be used for physical component fault
detection, not cyber network fault. In addition, designing an traditional observer for cyber
network fault detection is impossible because, in realistic CPS, cyber network fault model
cannot be obtained ahead of time.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The proposed novel prognosis scheme is shown to quickly detect and predict cyber
network faults using PDF monitoring and estimation. Moreover, soft and hard faults are
isolated to optimize the computational cost of resilience control. The convergence of the
future delay distribution estimation and the system state prediction are theoretically proven.
With the proposed resilience controller, the adverse effects caused by cyber network faults
are efficiently mitigated.
The simulation results show that the proposed scheme accurately detect the cyber
network faults before the performance degrades beyond the acceptable range. Moreover,
the PTSOC is timely triggered to mitigate the negative effects on the CPSs performance.
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The overshoot is significantly reduced by 90% and TTR is shorten by 30%. Although
the accuracy of the soft and hard fault isolation can only achieve 84%, the hard faults are
100% detected. Those soft faults which are misclassified to hard faults only consume the
resources for triggering resilience controller. However, the stability of the entire CPS is
always guaranteed.
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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) according to NSF require seamless integration of
computational algorithms and physical component. The performance of the embedded
network which delivers signals between computational world and physical components
likely influence on the physical system performance in terms of functionality and stability.
Our objective is to enable efficient development of high-resilience CPSs that is a system
capable of changing its behavior and structure to adapt to dynamic uncertainties in cyber
space, such as cyber attacks, delay variation, and packet losses. Motivated by this, we
propose an one-class support vector machine (OCSVM) based prognostic scheme to detect
cyber network faults and predicted its effects on physical world, leading to predictable and
reliable behavior of the entireCPS. Then, a fault tolerant control is triggered at an appropriate
time to prevent unscheduled down-time and minimize the computational overhead. Finally,
we analyze and validate the proposed scheme in simulations.




Cyber-physical systems (CPS) plays an increasingly important role in industry and
everyday life. Self-driving cars, smart building controls, and smart grids are examples
of CPSs. All these applications include smart networked subsystems with embedded
sensors, processors, and actuators that sense and interact with the physical world. Whether
enhancing the forward collision prevention capability of a car, or improving the energy
efficiency of a building, CPSs are a source of competitive advantage in today’s innovation
economy. At the same time, networking the system components or subsystems increases the
complexity and vulnerability of the entire system, such as cyber security risks and attacks.
The consequences of cyber network faults could have severe impact on human lives and the
environment. Proactive efforts are needed to strengthen resilience and reliability for CPSs.
The overarching goal of this work is to ensure CPS network vulnerabilities are online
identified and addressed during physical system designs. For soft faults that affects network
performance but has no influence on physical system performance and stability, a warning
should be provided to human operators. Otherwise, hard faults resulting in hardware or
components get unrepairable damages and instability should be detected and addressed
ahead of time.
Inspired by this motivation, we proposed a novel prognosis scheme. The main
contributions are:
a) A novel one-class SVM based prognosis scheme for cyber network fault detection and
prediction.
b) Derived the estimation of network delay distribution based on time series analysis. The
convergence of the estimation error is presented in Lemma 1.
c) Proposed an isolation scheme to distinguish soft and hard faults based on the prediction
of potential failures on system states. Theorem 1 shows the convergence of such prediction.
d) Developed a decision making scheme for proactively triggering resilience control that
effectively avoids physical system failures.
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The rest paper is organized as following. In Section. 2, a motivation example is
given to illustrate the relationship of cyber condition and system behavior. Next, the related
works on SVM based fault diagnosis and prognosis are presented in Section. 3. In Section.
4, the proposed OCSVM based prognosis scheme is demonstrated. The simulation results
are shown in Section. 5 and the conclusions are given in Section. 6.
2. MOTIVATION
In this section, an example is given to illustrate the relation between cyber uncer-
tainties/faults and system behavior. A feedback loop with the simulated delays employs an
optimal controller to regulate a two input four output (2I4O) system Xu et al. (2012).
As a fault scenario, we assume that a route hijacking occurs to eavesdrop control
information is emulated. Such an attack increases delay and delay variation when the
attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between the controller and
actuators. The simulated network has a random topology of 11 nodes. The route through
the topology is altered because the attacker node relays the transmission such that the packet
delays vary for the controller loop, as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 2 shows the optimal controller making the system states converge before 10.5s.
Then, a route hijacking attack occurs. The sudden changes of delay at t = 10.5s makes the
system states vibrate. Consequently, the CPS becomes unstable due to such delay dynamics.
According to the above results, we can conclude that stochastic network dynamics
indeed affect the system performance. It is important to note that delay dynamics may occur
due to other network failures, such as traffic congestion, hardware damages in network,
and other types of cyber attacks. Cyberspace is particularly difficult to secure due to its
vulnerabilities of linkages between cyber and physical systems. Of growing concern is
the cyber threat to critical hardware devices. Cyber attacks could cause harm or disrupt
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services upon which our economy and the daily lives depend on. In light of the risk and
potential consequences of cyber events, strengthening the risk awareness and resilience of
CPSs has become an important mission.
3. RELATEDWORKS
In this section, the related works about SVM and and fault diagnosis and prognosis
are presented separately. Section. 3.1 introduces the successful application of SVMs in fault
diagnosis and prognosis. Then, the literature review about addressing network uncertainties
and dynamics in CPSs is presented in Section. 3.2.
3.1. SVM-based Approaches for Fault Diagnosis and Prognosis
Support vector machine (SVM) is a computational learning method based on the
statistical learning theory. Such technology becomes popular fault diagnostic and prognostic
field due to the excellence of data classification than the traditional method such as neural
network. In SVM community, one-class SVM (OCSVM) that can separate the data with
different distributions is suitable for the issues to be addressed in our work. According to
the motivation example, the system instability is not induced by the occasionally long time
delay, but by the stochastic dynamics of delay and its distribution defined as cyber network
faults. Therefore, we propose an OCSVM based fault prognostic scheme to capture cyber
network faults and optimize the resilience control triggering.
Next, a survey of fault diagnosis and prognosis using SVM is presented.
The earliest application of SVM for fault diagnosis is Yan and Shao (2002). They
didn’t proposed any novel method for fault diagnosis. However, they first time employed an
non-linear SVM to classify healthy and faulty data samples.
Then, many researchers applied SVMs for fault diagnosis to bearing, induction
motor, machine tools, and other industrial system components, such as pump, compressors,
valve and turbine. In addition, the revised or improved SVMs are widely used in fault
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diagnosis of HVAC system, engine, rotating machine Yuan and Chu (2006), Yuan and
Chu (2007), and other machines. Samanta (2004) and Samanta (2004) employed genetic
algorithm (GA) to optimize the parameters of SVMs and extract features from original
and preprocessed signals. The trained SVM classifier was validated using the experimental
vibration data of a rotating machine and presented a better performance than artificial neural
network (ANN) based fault detection.
Zhang et al. (2006) proposed a learning method of probabilistic active SVM
(ProASVM) to detect fault of bearing with less number of samples on the condition of
keeping the classification accuracy. Sugumaran et al. (2007) employed decision tree (DT)
and proximal SVM (PSVM) to do fault diagnosis of roller bearing. Hu et al. (2007) proposed
a scheme combining wavelet package transform and SVM ensemble for fault diagnosis of
rolling element bearing.
In addition, Widodo et al. (2007) - Widodo and Yang (2008) applied SVM com-
bined by feature extraction via component analysis (PCA, ICA, KPCA, and KICA) to fault
diagnosis. Later, an advanced wavelet SVM (W-SVM) is proposed to improve the transient
current signal classification. Yuan and Chu (2006), Yuan and Chu (2007) applied PCA to
extract the optimal features and reduce the dimension of features. Then, artificial immu-
nization algorithm was used to optimize the parameters of SVM. The above SVM-based
fault diagnosis performed well with a plenty of data and a relatively enough training time.
However, these methods might not be suitable for complicated system fault diagnosis, such
as CPSs, because the collected data are massive, thus the training time could be too long
to feedback the fault information timely. Therefore, an improved SVM which potentially
provides a good performance on fault diagnosis in terms of accuracy, training time, and
dateset requirement is expected and needed.
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Inspired by this motivation, Yin et al. (2014) proposed a hybrid voting mechanism
based SVM (HVM-SVM) for satellite fault diagnosis with considering the characteristics
of small training data, multiple faults, and enormous parameters. The accuracy of fault
classification was validated.
Salahshoor et al. (2010) proposed a novel fault detection and diagnosis scheme for
condition machinery of an industrial steam turbine using the fusion of a SVM and adaptive
neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS). Such methodology can deal with a diverse set of
faults. Wang et al. (2014) proposed a ν-SVM which used the nearest neighbor (NN) to
realize the fast selection of ν based on training samples and applied locality preserving
projection (LPP) method to reduce the dimension of feature vectors by extracting the lower
dimensional manifold characteristics. Such that the training time was reduced as well as
computational overhead. Each residual work is designed to be sensitive to a subset of faults,
while remain insensitive to other faults. Unfortunately, few of the above works can be
applied to network fault prognosis in CPSs because network fault is diverse, stochastic, and
unpredictable about its type and time of occurrence.
Hence, a general and efficient fault prognosis scheme that can detect different types
of fault and predict their effects on the entire CPS is needed. The work presented in
this paper mainly focuses on cyber network fault prognosis of CPSs by a novel fusion of
one-class SVM, PDF identification, and system state prediction.
3.2. Fault Diagnosis and Prognosis of CPSs
The overall goals of cyber security include integrity (the trustworthiness of data or
resources), availability (accessibility upon demand), and confidentiality (keeping informa-
tion secret from unauthorized users). Many researchers addressed these issues with different
technologies, such as authentication schemes, access control, and other defense schemes
Amin et al. (2009) - Pasqualetti et al. (2013). An assumption that the adversary/attack
model is fully known is often required; however, it is challenging to obtain. In Amin
129
et al. (2009) deception and denial of service attacks against a networked control system are
addressed. They proposed a countermeasure based on semi-definite programming. This
work and the following literature are only valid for a specific attack model which cannot be
known in priori. A defense scheme without requiring the knowledge about the attack model
is needed.
In Liu et al. (2011), false data injection attacks against static state estimators are
introduced. Undetectable false data injection attacks can be designed even when the attacker
has limited resources. Also, stealthy deception attacks against the Supervisory Control and
DataAcquisition system are studied in Teixeira et al. (2010). Mo andSinopoli (2009) studied
the effect of replay attacks on a control system. In Amin et al. (2009), the effect of covert
attacks against control systems is investigated. A parameterized decoupling structure alter
the behavior of the physical plant while remaining undetected from the original controller.
Gamage et al. (2010) proposed a general theory of event compensation as an information
flow security enforcement mechanism for CPSs. Message scheduling methods were given
to improve the security quality of wireless networks for mission-critical CPSs in Jiang et al.
(2010). With respect to the above works, Pasqualetti et al. (2013) proposed a mathematical
framework for CPSs, attacks, and monitors, and given the fundamental limitations of
monitors from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives. Finally, centralized and
distributed attack detection and identification monitors were designed. Overall, many cyber
attacks can be addressed on the cyber side. However, the effects of cyber attacks/faults
on the physical system behavior are oversimplified in the above mentioned existing works.
Moreover, the injection time and model of the attacks/faults are difficult to learn ahead of
time in practical CPSs.
The control researchers focused on the conventional fault detection techniques that
have successfully applied to industrial networked control systems (NCSs). They indeed
considered the network delay and packet loss in various ways. In Zhu and Martinez (2011),
a resilient control problem is studied, in which control packets transmitted over a network
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are corrupted by a human adversary. They proposed a receding-horizon Stackelberg control
law to stabilize the control system despite the attack. However, the proposed approach
required a priori knowledge on attack model and type. In Liu and Yao (2005), network
delays were modeled as a constant delay (time buffer), an independent random delay, and
a delay with known probability distribution governed by the Markov chain model. In Liu
et al. (2007), a networked predictive controller in the presence of random delay in both
forward and feedback channels was proposed to minimized the effects of network failures.
A robust H∞ control for a nonlinear T-S fuzzy model system was proposed to address the
network delays and packet drop in Zhang et al. (2007). However, they assumed the upper
bound of delays is known. This is challenging to be satisfied in reality. Wang et al. (2008)
and Zhang-qing and Xian-zhong (2007) employed a state observer-based fault detection
method on the uncertain long time delay. Although, the network delays and packet drop
caused by network faults/failures were considered in above works, the assumptions, such as
known bounds and time-invariant distribution of delays and packet loss, are always made.
In addition, most of the above works aimed to detect the faults of physical components
(sensors, actuators, and system plant), not the faults in the cyberspace.
This work is motivated to address cyber network faults detection, isolation, and
prediction. Meanwhile, the the tolerant control scheme and it triggering strategy are
proposed to stabilize the CPS despite cyber network faults and optimize the computational
overhead.
4. OCSVM-BASED CYBER NETWORK FAULT PROGNOSIS SCHEME
In this section, the overview of the OCSVM-based cyber fault prognosis scheme is
given in Section. 4.1. The main idea of the fault detection is introduced in Section.4.2.
Then, the isolation of cyber hard and soft fault is demonstrated in Section. 4.3. At last the
resilience control scheme is introduced in Section. 4.4.
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4.1. Overview
In this work, the uncertainties in the cyberspace, including traffic congestions,
topology changes, and attacks, are considered erroneous delays and packet losses on the
physical system side. Monitoring such delays and packet losses online is required for
detection of cyber faults. Moreover, an observer is needed to detect physical system faults
and isolate them from cyber network faults.
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Figure 3. Flowchart of OCSVM-based prognosis scheme
The proposed prognosis scheme is shown in Fig. 3. It includes four main steps that
are continuous repeated:
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a) Data collection of network delays. n delays ([dk−n+1, · · · , dk]) in the sliding
window will be the inputs of OCSVM to labeled as normal or erroneous data. The data in
the sliding window is updated over time.
b) Cyber fault detection. The input delays are classified into normal and abnormal
group. When the new abnormal delay is labeled, we consider an abnormality occurs in
the cyberspace. However, only one abnormal delay detection can not be consider a cyber
network fault because unexpected delay might presents even the cyber condition is perfect.
Therefore, the probability for erroneous delays Pkf is calculate and a threshold Rp f is defined.
If Pkf exceeds Rp f , the cyber network fault is detected and the following computation for
fault isolation is active as the same time.
c) Potential degradation prediction. If a cyber network fault is detected, the PDF
of erroneous delay distribution is predicted by using time series analysis. Then, the delays
following the new distribution are resampled. Finally, the prediction of the physical system
states is obtained. If the system states deviate out of the acceptable range, the hard fault
is detected. Such type of faults might lead to wear and tear of devices, instability of the
entire CPSs, even hardware damages. Otherwise, the soft fault is not severe enough to
trigger the resilience controller. It is hard to detect by traditional fault diagnosis schemes
because such faults will not immediately affect the CPS stability. Hence, an early warning
could be missed. However, such type of faults should not be ignored because they might
become severe problems in the near future. Therefore, detecting them and giving a warning
to the human operators are necessary and essential. More details about fault isolation are
presented in Section. 4.3.
d) Resilience controller triggering. If a hard fault is detected, the resilience controller
is triggered and its parameters are tuned online by the probabilities of delays computed in
c).
133
Such a scheme can detect stochastic cyber failures/attacks without requiring the
knowledge of attack model and its injection time a priori. Only real-time OCSVM classi-
fication of delays is required to do distribution and system states prediction. Moreover, the
resilience control law tuned by the probabilities of predicted delays is derived accurately
for the given cyber performance. Its details are introduced in Section. 4.4.
4.2. OCSVM-based Cyber Network Fault Detection
One-class SVMmodel estimates the support of a distribution by identifying regions
in input space where most of the cases lie. It projects the data into a feature space, in where
separating the data from the origin by as large a margin as possible.
In this paper, we are interested in the ability of the one-class SVM algorithm to
model the distribution of network delays, i.e., the normal delays without cyber fault. All
abnormal delays will be recognized as outliers. These outliers are the inputs of system state
predictor to predict the potential threats for the system stability.
To facilitate the identification of outliers as abnormal delays, we assume the distri-
bution of normal delays are known. The one-class SVM can model a decision boundary of
there normal delays. When the outliers are detected, we consider an abnormality happens.
Then, the abnormal delays can be classified to one of “healthy” and “faulty” group.
To give a precise problem statement for the one-class SVMalgorithm, somenotations
are needed:
a) Let Φ : <n → F be the nonlinear mapping from data space<n to feature space
F that is implicit and usually unknown in all kernel method;
b) ξi is slack variable for each point in the dataset;
c) ρ is the distance to the origin in feature space;
d) ω is the parametrization of the hyper-plane separating the origin from the data in
F;
e) ν is the expected fraction of data points outside the estimated support.
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The one-class SVM algorithm computes the support vectors in D by considering
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to introduce the kernel function k(xi, x j) = Φ(xi).Φ(xi) into the calculation.





αik(xi, x) − ρ (3)
If x is an outlier, f (x) will be a negative value. The data points xi for which
0 < αi < 1mν holds are the support vectors; They directly lie on the separating hyperplane
in F.
Here, we used the Gaussian (4) with width parameter σ as kernel function.





By using this method, erroneous delays and it distribution can be easily obtained for
the next fault isolation.
4.3. Soft and Hard Cyber Network Fault Isolation
In this subsection, an algorithm for distinguishing soft and hard cyber network faults
is proposed. First, the delay distribution in the future is predicted. Next, its potential effects
on system performance is evaluated.
The isolation scheme includes three main steps that are repeated until the resilience
controller is triggered:
Step 1: future delay distribution estimation and resampling;
Step 2: system performance prediction;
Step 3: soft and hard fault isolation and resilience control triggering
These steps are discussed in details next.
4.3.1. Step 1: Future Delay Distribution Estimation and Resampling. One-
class SVM provides the faulty delays. Then, the KDE-based PDF identifier Bi and Zawod-
niok (2017) can estimate the distribution of those delays assuming they follow a normal
distribution. The expectation and standard deviation can be obtained.
Time series analysis is used to estimate the autoregressive (AR) model for the
expectation E and standard deviation D of the future distribution. The main point of this
algorithm is that use the difference between the estimate of the future expectation and actual
one to update the coefficients of AR model. When the coefficients converge, the AR model
can provide an accurate approximation of the future distribution features. The following
part presents the details about our application.


















where Ê(k + 1|k) is the forecast of E(k + 1|k) and D(k + 1|k) based on E(k) and D(k),





























The one-period ahead forecast error is:












The forecast errors converge by minimizing the following objective index:
J =





eE (k + 1)
eD(k + 1)
 (8)
Such that the update law of θ̂(k), L(k), and O(k) can be obtained.
θ̂(k) = θ̂(k − 1) + L(k)e(k)
L(k) = O(k − 1)ϕ(k)
ϕ(k)TO(k − 1)ϕ(k)
O(k) = (I − L(k)ϕ(k)T )O(k − 1)
(9)
where L(k) and O(k) denote estimator gain and estimation of error variance, respectively.
Their initial values are randomly set.
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Lemma 1: With the update law (9) and more new delays loaded in the sliding
window, the objective index (8) is continuously minimized. Then the following statements
are true:
a) the estimation errors of the expected value and standard deviation of faulty delays
converge.
b)
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 holds.
The proof can be found in Qin (1998) and Simon (2006).
Remark 1: Even if the network condition is perfect, unexpected delays, which
are out of the healthy range, occasionally occurs in a long period. That can lead to the
inefficient triggering of resilience control. Using the above time series analysis, not only
the distribution change can be tracked in real-time, but also the trend of distribution change
is identified and predicted. Such that the occasional event can be filtered without resilience
control triggering.
Then, based on the future delay distribution provided by (1), a series of random
delays is generated, which follows the new distribution.
4.3.2. Step 2: System Output Prediction. The resampled delays are fed to the
system model which takes into account dynamic delays and packet losses. Such a time-
varying system is given by:
z(k + 1) = Az(k)z(k) + Bz(k)u(k) (10)
where z =
[
x(k)T u(k − 1)T ... u(k − d)T
]T
is the state variables vector; uk is the
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In×n if the control input is received at time k
0n×n if the control input is lost at time k
Finally, the possible system behavior induced by the new distribution of delays are
estimated and denoted as ẑk .
Prediction Convergence Analysis: The prediction error z˜k convergence is demon-
strated in Theorem 1. The dynamic matrices Az j and Bz j for each delay interval are
deterministic and their calculation can be found in Xu et al. (2012).
Theorem 1 (Error of system states prediction convergence): As the delay data keeps
updating PDF identifier and
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 is satisfied, then the
prediction error for system output ‖ z˜(k) ‖ asymptotically converges to zero.
Proof: The prediction error is given by
z˜k = zk − ẑk
= (Az(k) − Bz(k)K(k))z(k) − (Âz(k) − B̂z(k)K(k))z(k)
= (Az(k) − Âz(k))z(k) − (Bz(k) − B̂z(k))K(k)z(k)
= (A˜z(k) − B˜z(k)K(k))z(k)
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Therefore, the convergence of z˜i can be proven by proving the convergence of A˜z(k) and
B˜z(k)
We define the prediction error of Az(k) as A˜z(k) = Az(k) − Âz(k). Az(k) can
be expressed as
∑n
j=1 Pj(k)Az j Pj(k) is the actual probability at k. Similarly, we denoteAz(k) = ∑nj=1 P̂j(k)Az j . P̂j(k) is the estimate probability provided by the PDF profile. The
estimation error of the probability is P˜j(k) = Pj(k) − P̂j(k). Then, Lyapunov function
candidate is VAz(k) = A˜z(k)T A˜z(k).
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Since VAz(k) is positive definite and ∆VAz(k) is negative definite provided
( ‖∑n




< 0 (Lemma 1). Therefore, the prediction error
of Az(k) asymptotically converge to zero. Similarly, the prediction error of Bz(k) can be
proven with the same procedure. Such that z˜(k) asymptotically converge to zero.
Remark 2: Themaximum error occurs when the first sample of the new distribution
comes in the sliding window. Then, the accuracy of PDF estimation improves as the sliding
window includes more and more new samples from the new distribution after the PDF
change occurs. Therefore,
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 holds.
4.3.3. Step 3: Soft and Hard Fault Isolation and Resilience Control Triggering
Strategy. The acceptable error magnitude of state i is defined as Rẑi . If the deviation of
the state ẑi exceeds its residual Rẑi , this fault is marked as a hard cyber network fault. A
warning is triggered as well as the resilience controller. Otherwise, this is a soft fault that
can be handled with the original controller operating normally.
In summary, the proposed prognosis scheme can timely detect cyber network faults
and isolate soft and hard faults because the dynamics of the network is continuously
monitored. Accurately isolating soft and hard fault optimize the decision of resilience
controller triggering as well as the computational resources allocation. When hard faults
occur, the resilience controller can be timely triggered before adverse effects on system
performance happening.
4.4. Resilience Control Strategy
The employed resilience controller is presented for completeness. PDF-based tuning
of stochastic optimal controller (PTSOC) Bi and Zawodniok (2017) mitigates the adverse
effects induced by the uncertainties of cyberspace and adapt to the random occurrence of
cyber network faults. The stability analysis can be found in Bi and Zawodniok (2017).
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The PTSOC control law considers the PDF of future delays by optimizing aweighted
summation of cost functions of different delay ranges (11). Each weight is the probability











Pi(xkTi Qzixki + ukTi Rziuki )
]
(11)
where i presents the delay interval (dinti < dk < dint(i + 1)); n is the total number of delay
cases; k represents sampling interval; Pi is probability of delay within dinti to dint(i + 1)
provided by the PDF identifier; xi is the states vector; ui is the control inputs vector;
Qzi = diag[Qi, Rid , ...] and Rzi = Rid are symmetric positive semi-definite and symmetric
positive definite respectively. E[•] is the expectation operator.
By optimizing (11), the control input is given by:







where K(k) is the optimal gain and u(k) is the control input; Szi(k) ≥ 0 is the solution of the
algebraic riccati equation (ARE) equation; nd = dupper/dint , dupper is the maximum delay
in the sliding window; Pi(k) is the probability of dinti < d(k) < dint(i + 1).
5. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the proposed prognosis scheme is evaluated by simulations in MAT-
LAB. Both soft and hard cyber network fault scenarios are presented separately in Sections.
5.1 and 5.2. The resilience controller in Section. 4.4 is applied. A conventional fault
detection scheme is employed as a reference.
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A continuous-time batch reactor system is taken as a case study. Its dynamics are
given by Xu et al. (2012).
Ûx =

1.38 −0.2077 6.715 −5.676
−0.5814 −4.29 0 0.675
1.067 4.273 −6.654 5.893









u = Ax + Bu (14)
where A and B are system dynamic matrices that correspond to the A and B in (10).
The parameters of this CPS are selected as:
a) The sampling time is 100ms;
b) The considered delays in the system model is less than 2 sampling interval, d = 2;
c) The delay interval dint (11) is 0.1s;
d) The threshold of the probability variation Rpi is 0.03s, unless otherwise states;
e) The sliding window size M is 30.
5.1. Soft Fault Scenario
A network congestion is taken as an soft fault example. Such congestion leads to
a gradually fluctuation of network delays. A big challenge of such fault detection is the
distribution of the faulty data usually overlaps with the one of healthy data. Thus, the
accuracy of data classification cannot be always guaranteed.
The following example will demonstrate the soft fault detection performance of
the proposed scheme and also provide its limitations. The results are only for a specific
scenario. Before the first 50s, the delays follow a normal distribution N(0.52, 0.022). Then,
a network congestion attack (e.g. denial-of-service) occurs at 50s and the delays after 50s
follow a new normal distribution N(0.55, 0.12). The window size is 100.
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Table 1. Fault capturing accuracy over time
Time Precision Recall Accuracy
t=50.3s 0 0 0
t=50.5s 36.4% 80% 80%
t=50.7s 71.4% 71.4% 71.4%
t=50.9s 75% 72.7% 72.7%
t=51.1s 66.7% 76.9% 76.9%
t=51.3s 66.7% 76.9% 76.9%
Fig. 4 and Table. 1 shows that the proposed scheme can detect the faulty data
from 50.3s. However, the accuracy is low because of the severe overlap of the healthy and
fault data. As the number of faulty data increasing, the precision, recall, and accuracy are
significantly improved.
When the fault is detected, the state prediction is activated to estimate the possibly
negative effects on the system performance in the future. Fig. 5 shows the three time
predictions at 50.3s, 50.5s, and 51.3s. The oscillation are observed, but small enough for
the basic controller to handle. Therefore, this fault is a soft fault. The resilience controller
does not have to be triggered.
Moreover, it is clear that the state prediction becomes closer and closer to the actual
system behavior over time. That is because more faulty data coming in the sliding window
provides more information about the fault data distribution, thus its estimate become more
and more accurate.
5.2. Hard Fault Scenario
As a hard fault scenario, a man-in-the-middle attack -attacker secretly relays and
possibly alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly com-
municating with each other- is simulated. The transmitted information, such as control
commands and feedback measurements, can be eavesdropped and delayed.
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Figure 4. Data classification performance
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Figure 5. System states prediction performance
Table 2. The crossing points
Variables Estimated point Actual point Estimation Error
Fluid level 48s 48s 0
Inside temperature 48.4s 48.6s 0.4%
Product outlet flow rate 48.2s 48.2s 0%
Coolant outlet temperature 48.2s 48.3s 0.2%
Here, the delays before 47s follows a normal distribution (0.25, 0.12). Then, the
attacker injects MitM attacks intermittently. As the results, the distribution of delays is
varied over time. The acceptable error magnitudes are set for four system states: 100cm for
the fluid level; 50k for the inside temperature; 50g/s for the product outlet flow rate; and
50k for the coolant outlet temperature.
As Fig. 6 showing, the sudden change of delay at 47s is detected at t = 47.3s, a
fault is detected because the probability of faulty data exceeds the threshold (3%) as shown
in Fig. 7. The actual faulty delays are 100% recognized.
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Delay induced by attacks
Delay before attacks
Figure 6. Delays
Figure 7. Data classification performance at t=47.3s
In Fig. 8 all the predicted system outputs exceed their acceptable range. The
estimated and actual points that the system states pass through the acceptable error are
shown in Table. 2. This prediction can achieve at least 99% accuracy. Therefore, we can
conclude that this fault is a hard cyber network fault and the resilience control (PTSOC)
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Figure 8. State prediction performance at t=47.3s
is triggered at 47.3s to mitigate such effects. The overshoots are reduced by at least 70%
comparing with the original controller SOC, the TTRs are shortened by 10%. The summary
of improvements can be found in Table. 3.
The proposed scheme quickly detects the fault because OCSVM can accurately
separate the faulty and healthy data and isolate the hard fault quickly based on the state pre-
diction. Then, the resilience controller is timely triggered ahead of the serious degradation
of system performance.
The above simulation is repeated for 50 times. All the faults are accurately detected.
Meanwhile, the overshoot of each system output is significantly reduced in term of its
corresponding TTR. In contrast, without applying the proposed scheme, the fault still can
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Figure 9. Fault tolerant performance
be detected when the system states exceed the acceptable error magnitude at 48s. However,
it is too late to recover the system performance with such a late activation of the resilience
controller. In such case, the basic controller PID will try to apply excessive actuation to
stabilize. Thismight lead to significantly damage of the components or cause an unscheduled
downtime. Even worse, the system could be compelled to stop.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The proposed novel prognosis scheme is shown to quickly detect and predict cyber
network faults using one-class SVM and PDF estimation. Combining with the state predic-























































































































































































































optimize the computational cost of resilience control. Their convergence are theoretically
proven. With the proposed resilience controller, the adverse effects caused by cyber network
faults are efficiently mitigated.
The simulation results show that the proposed scheme accurately detect the cyber
network faults before the performance degrades beyond the acceptable range. Moreover,
the PTSOC is timely triggered to mitigate the negative effects on the CPSs performance.
Comparing with the traditional SOC, the overshoot is significantly reduced by 70% and TTR
is shorten by 10%. Comparing with PID controller, the improvements of the overshoot and
TTR achieve 92% and 10%.
In this work, we applied the proposed scheme to a model-based CPS. For the future
work, more applications to other CPSs without the knowledge of system model will be
investigated and studied.
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2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the first paper, a novel routing scheme is proposed to improve the QoS and
performance of network in CPSs. This work is done by using RBF neural network to
model the relation between power and maximum communication capacity which is the
critical reference for routing optimization. Such scheme is applied to P2P and E2E path
optimization to guarantee the vital transmission safety. Also, this scheme can ensure a high
quality of service (QoS) under imperfect network condition, even cyber attacks.
Next, in the second paper, the imperfection, uncertainties, and dynamics in the cy-
berspace are considered both in systemmodel and controller design. A online PDF identifier
is proposed to capture the time-varying delays and its distribution. With the modification of
traditional stochastic optimal control using PDF of delays, the assumption of full knowledge
of network imperfection in priori is relaxed. Comparing with traditional stochastic control,
the proposed controller achieves a better performance in terms of overshoot, time-to-recover,
and operation cost. Also, this controller is considered a novel resilience control strategy for
latter papers about cyber fault diagnosis and prognosis.
After that, in the third paper, we turn to the development of a general framework
for cyber fault diagnosis scheme for CPSs wherein the cyberspace performance affect the
physical system and vice versa. The proposed diagnosis scheme is capable of detecting
cyber fault by monitoring the probability of delays. Also, the isolation of cyber and physical
system fault is achievedwith cooperatingwith the traditional observer based physical system
fault detection. The adverse effects caused by cyber network faults are effectively mitigated
with appropriately triggering the PTSOC resilience controller.
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Based on the study presented in the third paper, we turns out a novel cyber fault
prognosis scheme in the fourth paper, which can detect and estimate cyber fault and its
negative effects on system performance ahead of time. Not only cyber and physical system
faults are distinguished, but also soft and hard cyber faults are isolated depending onwhether
potential threats on system stability is predicted. Moreover, the convergence of the future
delay distribution estimation and the system state prediction are theoretically proven. With
the proposed resilience controller, the adverse effects caused by cyber network faults are
efficiently mitigated.
Finally, the fifth paper presents an improve prognosis scheme with applying one-
class SVM (OCSVM) to enhance the accuracy of fault detection and isolation.The results
demonstrate that the detection of the attacks is faster than the traditional approach where
one has to wait for the physical states to be deteriorated. However, the proposed scheme is
applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while revealing
limitation to sophisticated attacks.
APPENDIX A
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1. Stability Analysis for the PTSOC
Two theorems and their corresponding proofs are presented to demonstrate the
stability of the proposed PTSOC. Lyapunov-based stability analysis is used. Theorem 1
shows the control gain estimation asymptotically converges even if PDF estimation has an
error provided it asymptotically converges to zero. Theorem 2 considers the irremovable
bias of PDF estimation as a bounded disturbance. However, a UUB stability is guaranteed.
Theorem 1 (Control gain estimation error convergence): As the delay data keeps
updating PDF identifier and
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 is satisfied, then the
estimation error for control gain ‖ K˜k ‖ asymptotically converges to zero.
Proof:
First, we define the estimation error of control gain K as K˜k = Kk − K̂k =∑n
j=1 Pk jK j −
∑n
j=1 P̂k jK j . Pi j is the actual probability at k. Then, Lyapunov function
candidate is VKk = K˜Tk K˜k .
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SinceVKk is positive definite and ∆VKk is negative definite provided K˜k = Kk − K̂k =∑n
j=1 Pk jK j −
∑n
j=1 P̂k jK j . Therefore, the estimation error of control gain asymptotically
converge to zero.
Theorem 2: (UUB Stability of the Regulation Error). Given the initial conditions
as the system state z0 and system matrices Az0, and Bz0, let u0(zk) be an initially admissible
control policy for the CPS (2). Let the control update law be given by (10) and (11) and if
the disturbance induced by the irremovable bias of PDF estimation has a bound ‖ dKDE ‖
and Kmin < 1/bmin such that the regulation error of system states has a uniformly ultimate
bounded convergence in the mean.
Proof:
Consider the following positive definite Lyapunov function candidate: Vzk = zTK zk .
zk is the state vector of k. The corresponding estimated Lyapunov is V̂zk , therefore, ∆V̂zk =
V̂zk+1 − V̂zk . We consider ∆V̂zkm = V̂z(k+1)m − V̂zk for each possible system matrices (Azkm and
Bzkm). m represents one of the possible cases. If the maximum value of ∆V̂zkm is negative
definite, the system convergence is proved. The irremovable bias of PDF estimation is
considered the system state disturbance dk bounded by dM .
∆V̂zkm = V̂zk+1m − V̂zkm
=‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖2 − ‖ zk ‖2
=
( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ + ‖ zk ‖ )︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
∆3( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
= ∆3
( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
≤ ∆3
( ‖ amax − bminKminzk + dM ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
≤ ∆3
(
amax + bminKmin ‖ zk ‖ + ‖ dM ‖ − ‖ zk ‖
)
∀k = 1, 2, · · · , ∀m = 1, 2, · · · , nd
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where ∆3 is positive definite, bmin = min
{ ‖ Bzk1 ‖, ‖ Bzk2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Bzkm ‖ }, Kmin =
min
{ ‖ K1 ‖, ‖ K2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Knd ‖ }.
Since V̂zk is positive definite and ∆V̂Kk is negative definite provided the system state
‖ zk ‖≥ ‖dM ‖+Amax1−bminKmin and Kmin < 1/bmin. Therefore, UUB stability of the regulation error is
proved.
For each delay interval, the cost function is (A.1) and the optimal control law is
derived using A.1. The cost function of PTSOC defined by (A.2) is a probability weighted
sum of the cost functions for all delay intervals. Similarly, the PTSOC law derived in
Section. 4.4.1 is the summation of the weighted SOC laws of delay intervals. These




(zTmQzzm + uTmRzum)] k = 0, 1, 2, · · · (A.1)
where Qz = diag
{
Q, R/d, · · · }, and Rz = R/d are symmetric positive semi-definite and
symmetric positive definite respectively. zm is the state variables vector, and um is the







Pi(xkTQixk + ukTi Riuki ) (A.2)
where dint represents the delay interval that we take 0.1s in the simulation section. If
dint < dk < dint(i + 1), dk is classified in ith delay case; n is the total number of delay cases;
k represents sampling interval; Pi is probability of delay within dinti to dint(i + 1) provided
by the KDE-based PDF identifier; x is states vector; ui is control inputs vector; Qi and Ri
are weighted constants of states and control inputs, respectively.
As the probabilities of each possible delay changes, PTSOC continuously tracks
the network dynamics with a PDF identifier and updates its parameters based on PDF
information of delay to adapt to the given system situation.
APPENDIX B
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1. PDF Identification Algorithm
The algorithm is shown in the following table:
Online PDF Identification Algorithm
1. Determining the data in the sliding window for time k:
a) Choosing a kernel function K centered on x with a bandwidth h;
b) Each observation xi receives a specific weight proportional to the
scaled distance from the observation xi to x, which is
u = (x − xi)/h;
c) At a given x, the estimate is found by vertically summing up over
the k shapes.
This can be synthesized as:
f̂ (x) = 1nh xi ∈ [x − h2, x + h2 ]
The general formula for KDE will be given by
f̂k(x) = 1nh
∑n
i=1 K( x−xih )
where the dependence of the estimate on the kernel function K(.)
is denoted as f̂k .
2. Updating the new data for time k + 1 in the sliding window and go
back to Step 1;
2. Theorem 2 and Proof (To be included in paper as the approach)
Theorem 2 (Control gain estimation error convergence): As the delay data keeps
updating PDF identifier and
( ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜(k+1) j ‖ − ‖ ∑nj=1 P˜k j ‖ ) < 0 is satisfied, then the
estimation error for control gain ‖ K˜k ‖ asymptotically converges to zero.
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Proof:
First, we define the estimation error of control gain K as K˜k = Kk − K̂k =∑n
j=1 Pk jK j −
∑n
j=1 P̂k jK j . Pi j is the actual probability at k. Then, Lyapunov function
candidate is VKk = K˜Tk K˜k .
∆VKk = VKk+1 − VKk
= K˜Tk+1K˜k+1 − K˜Tk K˜k
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SinceVKk is positive definite and ∆VKk is negative definite provided K˜k = Kk − K̂k =∑n
j=1 Pk jK j −
∑n
j=1 P̂k jK j . Therefore, the estimation error of control gain asymptotically
converge to zero.
3. Theorem 3 and Proof (To be included in paper as the approach)
Theorem 3: (UUB Stability of the Regulation Error). Given the initial conditions
as the system state z0 and system matrices Az0, and Bz0, let u0(zk) be an initially admissible
control policy for the CPS (6). Let the control update law be given by (8) and (9) and if
the disturbance induced by the irremovable bias of PDF estimation has a bound ‖ dKDE ‖
and Kmin < 1/bmin such that the regulation error of system states has a uniformly ultimate
bounded convergence in the mean.
Proof:
Consider the following positive definite Lyapunov function candidate: Vzk = zTK zk .
zk is the state vector of k. The corresponding estimated Lyapunov is V̂zk , therefore, ∆V̂zk =
V̂zk+1 − V̂zk . We consider ∆V̂zkm = V̂z(k+1)m − V̂zk for each possible system matrices (Azkm and
Bzkm). m represents one of the possible cases. If the maximum value of ∆V̂zkm is negative
definite, the system convergence is proven. The irremovable bias of PDF estimation is
considered the system state disturbance dk bounded by dM .
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∆V̂zkm = V̂zk+1m − V̂zkm
=‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖2 − ‖ zk ‖2
=
( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ + ‖ zk ‖ )︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
∆3( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
= ∆3
( ‖ Azkm − BzkmKk zk + dk ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
≤ ∆3
( ‖ amax − bminKminzk + dM ‖ − ‖ zk ‖ )
≤ ∆3
(
amax + bminKmin ‖ zk ‖ + ‖ dM ‖ − ‖ zk ‖
)
∀k = 1, 2, · · ·
∀m = 1, 2, · · · , nd
where ∆3 is positive definite, bmin = min
{ ‖ Bzk1 ‖, ‖ Bzk2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Bzkm ‖ }, Kmin =
min
{ ‖ K1 ‖, ‖ K2 ‖, · · · , ‖ Knd ‖ }.
Since V̂zk is positive definite and ∆V̂Kk is negative definite provided the system state
‖ zk ‖≥ ‖dM ‖+Amax1−bminKmin and Kmin < 1/bmin. Therefore, UUB stability of the regulation error is
proven.
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4. Other results for Case A, B, and C
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Coolant Outlet Temperature (K)
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Estimated states at t=47.1s
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Estimated states at t=47.5s
Case A: Actual and predicted system behavior
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Case B: Predicted and Actual System Behavior
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Case C: Predicted and Actual System Behavior









































































































Case C: Fault mitigation performance
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